IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ief/reveye/v42y2004i2p29-62.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Reglas de selección para la fiscalización de Impuestos a las Ventas

Author

Listed:
  • Roberto José Arias

    () (Universidad Nacional de La Plata - Ministerio de Economía de la Prov. de Buenos Aires)

Abstract

In this paper we discuss the relevance of the major results found on the literature about optimal auditing rules to the case of a commodity tax. We found out that literature’s usual recommendations are not applied by tax administrations. In our understanding, this happens because of: i) there is a key difference between the assumed objective (theoretical) of the tax administration and the actual objectives, ii) every model assumes that taxpayers know audit rules, when in fact they are kept confidential by the tax administration. iii) most models restrict tax evasion to underreporting, iv) there might be practical or non-economical issues that prevent tax administrations using optimal auditing rules. We conclude that optimal audit rules bring in a very important issue usually neglected when tax administrations design an auditing policy: the impact of the audit policy on the returns of non-audited taxpayers.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberto José Arias, 2004. "Reglas de selección para la fiscalización de Impuestos a las Ventas," Revista de Economía y Estadística, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Instituto de Economía y Finanzas, vol. 0(2), pages 29-62, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:ief:reveye:v:42:y:2004:i:2:p:29-62
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ief.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/publicaciones/economiayestadistica/2004_42_n2/3_arias.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, J David, 2002. "Auditing with Signals," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 69(273), pages 1-20, February.
    2. Murray, Matthew N., 1995. "Sales Tax Compliance and Audit Selection," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 48(4), pages 515-30, December.
    3. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1987. " The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(2), pages 183-192.
    4. Eduardo Engel & James R. Hines Jr., 1998. "Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics," Documentos de Trabajo 47, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    5. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics,in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470 Elsevier.
    6. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June.
    7. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider, 2003. "Multiple Modes of Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence from the TCMP," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0306, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    8. Kaplow, Louis, 1990. "Optimal taxation with costly enforcement and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 221-236, November.
    9. Graetz, Michael J & Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, Spring.
    10. Alm, James & Blackwell, Calvin & McKee, Michael, 2004. "Audit Selection and Firm Compliance With a Broad-Based Sales Tax," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 57(2), pages 209-227, June.
    11. Andreoni, James, 1992. "IRS as loan shark tax compliance with borrowing constraints," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 35-46, October.
    12. Myles,Gareth D., 1995. "Public Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521497695.
    13. Erard, Brian & Ho, Chih-Chin, 2001. "Searching for ghosts: who are the nonfilers and how much tax do they owe?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 25-50, July.
    14. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2003:i:9:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Torgler, Benno, 2003. "To evade taxes or not to evade: that is the question," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 283-302, July.
    16. Murray, Matthew N., 1995. "Sales Tax Compliance and Audit Selection," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 48(4), pages 515-530, December.
    17. repec:exe:wpaper:95/08 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Myles, G.D. & Naylor, R.A., 1995. "Tax Evasion, Social Customs and Optimal Auditing," Discussion Papers 9508, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
    19. Alm, James & McKee, Michael, 2004. "Tax compliance as a coordination game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 297-312, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Commodity Tax; Auditing Rules; Auditing Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ief:reveye:v:42:y:2004:i:2:p:29-62. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marcelo Coser). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ieuncar.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.