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Reglas de selección para la fiscalización de Impuestos a las Ventas

  • Roberto José Arias

    ()

    (Universidad Nacional de La Plata - Ministerio de Economía de la Prov. de Buenos Aires)

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    In this paper we discuss the relevance of the major results found on the literature about optimal auditing rules to the case of a commodity tax. We found out that literature’s usual recommendations are not applied by tax administrations. In our understanding, this happens because of: i) there is a key difference between the assumed objective (theoretical) of the tax administration and the actual objectives, ii) every model assumes that taxpayers know audit rules, when in fact they are kept confidential by the tax administration. iii) most models restrict tax evasion to underreporting, iv) there might be practical or non-economical issues that prevent tax administrations using optimal auditing rules. We conclude that optimal audit rules bring in a very important issue usually neglected when tax administrations design an auditing policy: the impact of the audit policy on the returns of non-audited taxpayers.

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    File URL: http://ief.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/publicaciones/economiayestadistica/2004_42_n2/3_arias.pdf
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    Article provided by Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Instituto de Economía y Finanzas in its journal Revista de Economía y Estadística.

    Volume (Year): XLII (2004)
    Issue (Month): 2 (July)
    Pages: 29-62

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    Handle: RePEc:ief:reveye:v:42:y:2004:i:2:p:29-62
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    1. Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996. "Tax Compliance," Working papers 9610r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    2. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521497695 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Eduardo M.R.A. Engel & James R. Hines, Jr., 1999. "Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics," NBER Working Papers 6903, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Graetz, Michael J & Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, Spring.
    5. Louis Kaplow, 1989. "Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement and Evasion," NBER Working Papers 2996, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Myles, G.D. & Naylor, R.A., 1995. "Tax Evasion, Social Customs and Optimal Auditing," Discussion Papers 9508, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
    7. Erard, Brian & Ho, Chih-Chin, 2001. "Searching for ghosts: who are the nonfilers and how much tax do they owe?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 25-50, July.
    8. Andreoni, James, 1992. "IRS as loan shark tax compliance with borrowing constraints," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 35-46, October.
    9. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2003:i:9:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Ines Macho-Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo, 2000. "Auditing with Signals," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0660, Econometric Society.
      • Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, J David, 2002. "Auditing with Signals," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 69(273), pages 1-20, February.
    11. Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 1985. "The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency," NBER Working Papers 1759, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Alm, James & McKee, Michael, 2004. "Tax compliance as a coordination game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 297-312, July.
    13. Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 2000. "Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration," NBER Working Papers 7473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Murray, Matthew N., 1995. "Sales Tax Compliance and Audit Selection," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 48(4), pages 515-30, December.
    15. Torgler, Benno, 2003. "To evade taxes or not to evade: that is the question," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 283-302, July.
    16. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider, 2003. "Multiple Modes of Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence from the TCMP," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0306, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    17. Alm, James & Blackwell, Calvin & McKee, Michael, 2004. "Audit Selection and Firm Compliance with a Broad-based Sales Tax," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 57(2), pages 209-27, June.
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