IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v81y2001i1p25-50.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Searching for ghosts: who are the nonfilers and how much tax do they owe?

Author

Listed:
  • Erard, Brian
  • Ho, Chih-Chin

Abstract

This paper is about "ghosts" - individuals who fail to comply with their income tax filing requirements. As their name suggests, the identities and characteristics of these individuals are shrouded in mystery. In this paper we attempt to de-mystify the issues surrounding ghosts and examine their role in the compliance process. We begin by extending a standard model of tax evasion to account for the existence of ghosts. We then examine the empirical significance and policy relevance of our extension using a unique data set containing detailed tax and audit information for both filers and non-filers of U.S.federal income tax returns.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Erard, Brian & Ho, Chih-Chin, 2001. "Searching for ghosts: who are the nonfilers and how much tax do they owe?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 25-50, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:81:y:2001:i:1:p:25-50
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047-2727(00)00132-8
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Erard, Brian, 1997. "Self-selection with measurement errors A microeconometric analysis of the decision to seek tax assistance and its implications for tax compliance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 319-356, December.
    2. Blumenthal, Marsha & Slemrod, Joel, 1992. "The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax System: A Second Look After Tax Reform," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 45(2), pages 185-202, June.
    3. Blumenthal, Marsha & Slemrod, Joel, 1992. "The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax System: A Second Look After Tax Reform," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 45(2), pages 185-202, June.
    4. Eduardo Engel & James R. Hines Jr., 1998. "Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics," Documentos de Trabajo 47, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    5. Cross, Rodney & Shaw, G K, 1982. "On the Economics of Tax Aversion," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 37(1), pages 36-47.
    6. Murphy, Kevin M & Topel, Robert H, 2002. "Estimation and Inference in Two-Step Econometric Models," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 20(1), pages 88-97, January.
    7. Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May.
    8. Frank A. Cowell, 1990. "Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262532484, December.
    9. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June.
    10. Morimune, Kimio, 1979. "Comparisons of Normal and Logistic Models in the Bivariate Dichotomous Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(4), pages 957-975, July.
    11. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    12. Alm, James & Bahl, Roy & Murray, Matthew N, 1991. "Tax Base Erosion in Developing Countries," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(4), pages 849-872, July.
    13. Manski, Charles F & Lerman, Steven R, 1977. "The Estimation of Choice Probabilities from Choice Based Samples," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(8), pages 1977-1988, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470, Elsevier.
    2. Kalina Koleva, 2005. "Seeking for an optimal tax administration: the efficiency costs’ approach [A la recherche de l'administration fiscale optimale : l'approche par les coûts d'efficience]," Post-Print halshs-00195354, HAL.
    3. Kalina Koleva, 2005. "A la recherche de l'administration fiscale optimale : l'approche par les coûts d'efficience," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques r05050, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    4. James, Simon & Edwards, Alison, 2010. "An annotated bibliography of tax compliance and tax compliance costs," MPRA Paper 26106, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. James Alm, 2019. "What Motivates Tax Compliance?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 353-388, April.
    6. Cécile Bazart, 2002. "Les comportements de fraude fiscale. Le face à face contribuables — administration fiscale," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 16(4), pages 171-212.
    7. Sagit Leviner, 2008. "An overview: A new era of tax enforcement – from “big stick” to responsive regulation," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 2(3), pages 360-380, September.
    8. Torgler, Benno, 2003. "To evade taxes or not to evade: that is the question," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 283-302, July.
    9. Papp, Tamás K. & Takáts, Előd, 2024. "Tax rate cuts and tax compliance – the Laffer curve revisited," Public Finance Quarterly, Corvinus University of Budapest, vol. 70(4), pages 9-28.
    10. James Alm & Todd Cherry & Michael McKee & Michael L. Jones, 2010. "Investigating Behavioral Responses to Positive Inducements for Filing Tax Returns," Working Papers 10-11, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    11. Niepelt, Dirk, 2005. "Timing tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1611-1637, September.
    12. Alejandro Esteller-More, 2004. "Tax Evasion in Interrelated Taxes," Public Economics 0401001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Wan, Junmin, 2021. "The lottery receipt," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 733-750.
    14. Alejandro Esteller, 2004. "Tax Evasion in Interrelated Taxes," Working Papers 2004/2, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    15. Glen Ueng, K. L. & Yang, C. C., 2001. "Plea bargaining with the IRS: extensions and further results," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 83-98, July.
    16. Traxler, Christian, 2010. "Social norms and conditional cooperative taxpayers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 89-103, March.
    17. Joseph G. Eisenhauer, 2006. "The Shadow Price of Morality," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 437-456, Summer.
    18. Coricelli, Giorgio & Rusconi, Elena & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2014. "Tax evasion and emotions: An empirical test of re-integrative shaming theory," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 49-61.
    19. Gaetano T. Spartà & Gabriele Stabile, 2018. "Tax compliance with uncertain income: a stochastic control model," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 261(1), pages 289-301, February.
    20. James Alm, 2012. "Measuring, explaining, and controlling tax evasion: lessons from theory, experiments, and field studies," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(1), pages 54-77, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:81:y:2001:i:1:p:25-50. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.