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The shadow price of a tax inspector

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  • Yitzhaki, Shlomo
  • Vakneen, Yitzhak

Abstract

Theeffects of tax evasion on tax rates and government revenues have focused fresh attention on the question of tax administration. Because of the difficulties of measuring the consequences of good or bad administration, policymakers cannot rely on a wide range of specific information on this subject. This paper presents a model which shows the process of auditing tax returns as a decision tree. Using this model, governments can verify that the additional power is not abused and that the administration is efficient. The main idea is to introduce economic considerations into the process of selecting and inspecting tax returns. By calculating the investment in the inspector's time at each stage (the taxpayer is likely to appeal), and the increase in revenue that would result, it is possible to calculate the minimum amount of tax evasion that justifies continuing the audit - the shadow price of the tax inspector. If the guidelines are followed the productivity of the inspectors will increase as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Yitzhaki, Shlomo & Vakneen, Yitzhak, 1988. "The shadow price of a tax inspector," Policy Research Working Paper Series 76, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:76
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Usher, Dan, 1986. "Tax Evasion and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(4), pages 563-586, October.
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    6. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    7. Richard Goode, 1981. "Some Economic Aspects of Tax Administration (Quelques aspects économiques de l'administration fiscale) (Algunos aspectos económicos de la administración de impuestos)," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 28(2), pages 249-274, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. José Durán-Cabré & Alejandro Esteller-Moré & Luca Salvadori, 2015. "Empirical evidence on horizontal competition in tax enforcement," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(5), pages 834-860, October.
    2. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470, Elsevier.
    3. Ahlberg, Joakim, 2006. "Optimal Taxation of Intermediate Goods in the Presence of Externalities: A Survey Towards the Transport Sector," Working Papers 2006:3, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute (VTI).
    4. Martin Besfamille & Cecilia Parlatore Siritto, 2009. "Modernization of Tax Administrations and Optimal Fiscal Policies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(6), pages 897-926, December.
    5. Nipon Poapongsakorn & Kovit Charnvitayapong & Duangmanee Laovakul & Somchai Suksiriserekul & Bev Dahlby, 2000. "A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Thailand Taxpayer Survey," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 7(1), pages 63-82, February.
    6. Martin Besfamille & Pablo Olmos, 2010. "Inspectors or Google Earth? Optimal fiscal policies under uncertain detection of evaders," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-09, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    7. Dimitri Romanov, 2003. "Costs and Benefits of Marginal Reallocation of Tax Agency Resources in Pursuit of the Hard-to-Tax," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0323, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

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