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Optimal observability in a linear income tax

  • Slemrod, Joel
  • Traxler, Christian

We study the optimal observability of the tax base within the standard linear income tax problem, where observability is determined by the government's investment into the accurate measurement of the tax base.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 108 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 105-108

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:2:p:105-108
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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  1. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Wojciech Kopczuk, 2008. "Transfer Program Complexity and the Take Up of Social Benefits," NBER Working Papers 14301, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Utilitarianism and horizontal equity : The case for random taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-33, June.
  3. Weiss, Laurence, 1976. "The Desirability of Cheating Incentives and Randomness in the Optimal Income Tax," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1343-52, December.
  4. Brito, D.L. & Hamilton, J.H. & Slutsky, S.M. & Stiglitz, J.E., 1989. "Randomization In Optimal Income Tax Schedules," Papers 89-6, Florida - College of Business Administration.
  5. Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1989. "Who profits from taxpayer confusion?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 49-55.
  6. Martin Hellwig, 2005. "The Undesirability of Randomized Income Taxation under Decreasing Risk Aversion," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_27, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  7. Emmanuel Saez & Joel B. Slemrod & Seth H. Giertz, 2009. "The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review," NBER Working Papers 15012, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1988. "A Note on Enforcement Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(4), pages 793-98, November.
  9. Kaplow, Louis, 1998. "Accuracy, Complexity, and the Income Tax," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 61-83, April.
  10. Dixit, Avinash K & Sandmo, Angar, 1977. " Some Simplified Formulae for Optimal Income Taxation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(4), pages 417-23.
  11. Scotchmer, Suzanne & Slemrod, Joel, 1989. "Randomness in tax enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 17-32, February.
  12. Pestieau, Pierre & Possen, Uri M. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1998. "The value of explicit randomization in the tax code," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 87-103, January.
  13. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
  14. Stern, Nicholas, 1982. "Optimum taxation with errors in administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 181-211, March.
  15. Kopczuk, Wojciech, 2001. "Redistribution when avoidance behavior is heterogeneous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 51-71, July.
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