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Randomness in tax enforcement

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  • Scotchmer, Suzanne
  • Slemrod, Joel

Abstract

For most parameter values, increased randomness about how much taxable income an auditor would assess leads to higher reported income and more revenue, When reducing randomness is costly, optimality requires some randomness in assessed taxable Income. Even if reducing randomness g costless, taxpayers may prefer some randomness when the increased revenue can be rebated, so that the government a revenue stays fixed. These results do not rely on the presence of a distortion in labor supply.
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Suggested Citation

  • Scotchmer, Suzanne & Slemrod, Joel, 1989. "Randomness in tax enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 17-32, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:38:y:1989:i:1:p:17-32
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1987. " The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(2), pages 183-192.
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