On the value of randomization
An optimal contract may involve randomization when the agents differ in their attitudes towards risk, so that randomization enables the principal to relax the incentive constraints. The paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for local random deviations to be welfare improving in a neighborhood of a nonrandom optimum.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2011|
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|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00639834|
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