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On the value of randomization

Author

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  • Stéphane Gauthier

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Guy Laroque

    (Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

An optimal contract may involve randomization when the agents differ in their attitudes towards risk, so that randomization enables the principal to relax the incentive constraints. The paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for local random deviations to be welfare improving in a neighborhood of a nonrandom optimum.

Suggested Citation

  • Stéphane Gauthier & Guy Laroque, 2011. "On the value of randomization," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00639834, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00639834
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00639834v2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Slemrod, Joel & Traxler, Christian, 2010. "Optimal observability in a linear income tax," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 105-108, August.
    2. Weiss, Laurence, 1976. "The Desirability of Cheating Incentives and Randomness in the Optimal Income Tax," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1343-1352, December.
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    8. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
    9. Brito, Dagobert L. & Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M. & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1995. "Randomization in optimal income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 189-223, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lang, Matthias, 2017. "Legal uncertainty as a welfare enhancing screen," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 274-289.
    2. Stéphane Gauthier & Guy Laroque, 2022. "Optimal Random Taxation and Redistribution," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03915336, HAL.
    3. Gauthier, Stéphane & Laroque, Guy, 2017. "Redistribution by means of lotteries," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 707-716.
    4. Matthias Lang, 2023. "Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(1), pages 104-134, March.
    5. Pietro Ortoleva & Evgenii Safonov & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities," Working Papers 2021-10, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    6. Philippe Choné & Romain De Nijs & Lionel Wilner, 2012. "Intertemporal Pricing with Unobserved Consumer Arrival Times," Working Papers 2012-23, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    7. Stéphane Gauthier & Guy Laroque, 2021. "Certainty Equivalence and Noisy Redistribution," SciencePo Working papers Main halshs-03359574, HAL.
    8. repec:hal:pseose:hal-01158155 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Random taxation; stochastic contract; second best; tax evasion.; Taxation aléatoire; contrats aléatoires; second rang; fraude fiscale.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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