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The Undesirability of Randomized Income Taxation under Decreasing Risk Aversion

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  • Martin Hellwig

    () (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

Abstract

For the standard specification of the utilitarian optimal income tax problem with hidden characteristics, the paper shows that randomized tax schemes are undesirable if preferences exhibit a property of weakly decreasing risk aversion according to the multidimensional risk aversion concept of Hellwig (2004). The property of decreasing risk aversion also implies uniqueness of the optimal income tax schedule and continuity in cases where the type distribution has a continuous density.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Hellwig, 2005. "The Undesirability of Randomized Income Taxation under Decreasing Risk Aversion," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_27, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2005_27
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    10. Hellwig, Martin F., 2007. "A contribution to the theory of optimal utilitarian income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1449-1477.
    11. Weiss, Laurence, 1976. "The Desirability of Cheating Incentives and Randomness in the Optimal Income Tax," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1343-1352, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nolan Miller & Alexander Wagner & Richard Zeckhauser, 2013. "Solomonic separation: Risk decisions as productivity indicators," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 265-297, June.
    2. Casey Rothschild & Florian Scheuer, 2014. "A Theory of Income Taxation under Multidimensional Skill Heterogeneity," NBER Working Papers 19822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Felix J., Bierbrauer, 2011. "On the optimality of optimal income taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2105-2116, September.
    4. Hellwig, Martin F., 2007. "A contribution to the theory of optimal utilitarian income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1449-1477.
    5. Simula, Laurent, 2009. "Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax and Nonlinear Pricing: Optimality Conditions and Comparative Static Properties," Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies 2009:11, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    6. Martin Hellwig, 2010. "Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 361-397.
    7. Laurence Ales & Kurnaz Musab & Sleet Christopher, "undated". "Task, Talent, and Taxes," GSIA Working Papers 2014-E16, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    8. Gauthier, Stéphane & Laroque, Guy, 2014. "On the value of randomization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 493-507.
    9. Hellwig, Martin F., 2007. "A contribution to the theory of optimal utilitarian income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1449-1477.
    10. Johanna Hey & Ulrich Schreiber & Fabian Pönnighaus & Felix Bierbrauer, 2013. "Steueroasen und »legale Steuervermeidung«: Wie kann größere Steuergerechtigkeit erreicht werden?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 66(11), pages 03-13, June.
    11. Martin Hellwig, 2010. "Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 361-397.
    12. Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2006. "The Threat of Capital Drain: A Rationale for Public Banks?," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    13. Laurence Ales & Kurnaz Musab & Sleet Christopher, "undated". "Task, Talent, and Taxes," GSIA Working Papers 2014-E16, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    14. Laurence Ales & Soo-Haeng Cho & Ersin Korpeoglu, "undated". "Innovation Tournaments with Multiple Contributors," GSIA Working Papers 2014-E17, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    15. Thomas Koch & Javier Birchenall, 2016. "Taking versus taxing: an analysis of conscription in a private information economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(3), pages 177-199, June.
    16. Slemrod, Joel & Traxler, Christian, 2010. "Optimal observability in a linear income tax," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 105-108, August.
    17. Martin Hellwig, 2008. "A Maximum Principle for Control Problems with Monotonicity Constraints," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_04, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    18. Laurent Simula, 2010. "Optimal nonlinear income tax and nonlinear pricing: optimality conditions and comparative static properties," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(2), pages 199-220, July.
    19. Felix Bierbrauer, 2010. "On the Optimality of Optimal Income Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series 3163, CESifo Group Munich.
    20. Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2006. "The Threat of Capital Drain: A Rationale for Public Banks?," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    21. repec:hal:pseose:hal-00969344 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal Income Taxation; Randomized Incentive Schemes; Nonincreasing Risk Aversion;

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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