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Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy
[Inspection et taxation optimales des émissions polluantes]

Author

Listed:
  • Philippe Bontems

    (Station d'économie et sociologie rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

  • Jean-Marc Bourgeon

    (Inconnu)

Abstract

Les auteurs étudient la politique optimale d'inspection et de taxation des émissions polluantes lorsque : (i) les coûts de réduction de la pollution sont inconnus du régulateur, (ii) les amendes pour fraude fiscale sont limitées supérieurement et (iii) le contrôle des polluants est coûteux. Ils montrent que la menace d'être contrôlé altère les incitations usuelles des firmes à surestimer leurs coûts de réduction de la pollution. En particulier, selon le coût, la politique optimale peut impliquer une sur-dissuasion ou une sous-dissuasion en termes de niveaux de pollution par rapport à la situation d'information parfaite. Dans une seconde partie, ils analysent les propriétés d'une politique basée sur une norme de rejets polluants. Les auteurs montrent que cette politique est proche (bien que moins efficace) d'une taxation des polluants associée à la norme lorsqu'on prend en compte les incitations économiques apportées par le mécanisme d'audit.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Bontems & Jean-Marc Bourgeon, 2005. "Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy [Inspection et taxation optimales des émissions polluantes]," Post-Print hal-02683203, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02683203
    DOI: 10.1016/s0014-2921(03)00036-9
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