Optimal tax enforcement under prospect theory
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- Luigi Mittone & Fabrizio Panebianco & Alessandro Santoro, 2016. "The Bomb-Crater Effect of Tax Audits: Beyond Misperception of Chance," Working Papers 583, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
More about this item
KeywordsTax evasion; Income tax enforcement; Prospect theory;
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2012-01-03 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2012-01-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2012-01-03 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-IUE-2012-01-03 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2012-01-03 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2012-01-03 (Public Finance)
- NEP-UPT-2012-01-03 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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