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Transaction-tax evasion in the housing market

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Abstract

We model the behaviour of a buyer trying to evade the real estate transfer tax. We identify over-appraisal as a key, easily-observable element that is inversely related with tax evasion. We conclude that the tax authority could focus auditing e orts on low-appraisal transactions. We include `behavioural'components (shame and stigma) allowing to introduce buyers'(education) and societal (social capital) characteristics that explain individual and idiosyncratic variations.Our empirical analysis con rms the predictions using a unique database, where we directly observe: real payment, value declared to the authority,appraisal, buyers' educational level and local levels of corruption and trust.

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  • José Garcia Montalvo & Amedeo Piolatto & Josep M. Raya, 2019. "Transaction-tax evasion in the housing market," Economics Working Papers 1645, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1645
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    Keywords

    transfer tax; tax evasion; second-hand housing market; overappraisal; Loan-To-Value; corruption; social capital; stigma; shame; education;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • R21 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Housing Demand

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