Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing
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- Edoardo Di Porto & Nicola Persico & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2013. "Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 35-62, February.
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- repec:eee:poleco:v:49:y:2017:i:c:p:71-83 is not listed on IDEAS
- Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2016. "Peer discipline and incentives within groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 19-30.
- Edoardo Di Porto & Leandro Elia & Cristina Tealdi, 2013. "The "emersion" effect: an ex post and ex ante social program evaluation on labor tax evasion in Italy," Working Papers 2/2013, IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca, revised Jun 2013.
- David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2014. "Peer Discipline and Incentives Within Groups," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000973, David K. Levine.
- David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2013. "Peer Discipline and the Strength of Organizations," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000000713, UCLA Department of Economics.
- David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2016. "Size, Fungibility, and the Strength of Lobbying Organizations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001316, David K. Levine.
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More about this item
Keywordsaudits; deterrence; tax evasion;
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2012-03-28 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2012-03-28 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-IUE-2012-03-28 (Informal & Underground Economics)
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