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Information and policing

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  • Ichihashi, Shota

Abstract

Agents decide whether to commit a crime based on their private types, which capture their heterogeneous returns from a crime. The police have information about these types. The police search agents, without commitment, to detect crime subject to a search capacity constraint. The deterrent effect of policing is lost when the police have full information about agents' types. The crime-minimizing information structure prevents the police from identifying agents who face high returns from a crime, while still allowing them to adjust their search intensities based on the types of agents who face low returns from a crime. The result extends to the case in which the police endogenously choose search capacity at a cost.

Suggested Citation

  • Ichihashi, Shota, 2025. "Information and policing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 225(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:225:y:2025:i:c:s0022053125000389
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105992
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    References listed on IDEAS

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