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How Bayesian Persuasion Can Help Reduce Illegal Parking and Other Socially Undesirable Behavior

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  • Penélope Hernández
  • Zvika Neeman

Abstract

We consider the question of how best to allocate enforcement resources across different locations with the goal of deterring unwanted behavior. We rely on "Bayesian persuasion" to improve deterrence. We focus on the case where agents care only about the expected amount of enforcement resources given messages received. Optimization in the space of induced mean posterior beliefs involves a partial convexification of the objective function. We describe interpretable conditions under which it is possible to explicitly solve the problem with only two messages: "high enforcement" and "enforcement as usual." We also provide a tight upper bound on the total number of messages needed to achieve the optimal solution in the general case as well as a general example that attains this bound.

Suggested Citation

  • Penélope Hernández & Zvika Neeman, 2022. "How Bayesian Persuasion Can Help Reduce Illegal Parking and Other Socially Undesirable Behavior," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 186-215, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:1:p:186-215
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190295
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ichihashi, Shota, 2025. "Information and policing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 225(C).
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    3. Ayouni, Mehdi & Friehe, Tim & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2024. "Bayesian persuasion in lawyer–client communication," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    4. Cheng Li & Yancheng Xiao, 2023. "Information design, externalities, and government interventions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(4), pages 821-839, August.
    5. Makoto Shimoji, 2023. "Setting an exam as an information design problem," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(3), pages 559-579, September.
    6. Tan, Teck Yong, 2023. "Optimal transparency of monitoring capability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    7. Maennig, Wolfgang & Wilhelm, Stefan, 2023. "News and noise in crime politics: The role of announcements and risk attitudes," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise

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