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Peer Discipline and the Strength of Organizations

  • David K Levine
  • Salvatore Modica
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    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/papers/peer-discipline.pdf
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    Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 786969000000000713.

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    Date of creation: 20 Jul 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000000713
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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    1. Shmuel Nitzan & Kaoru Ueda, 2010. "Prize Sharing in Collective Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 3212, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information 9409002, EconWPA.
    3. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1998. "When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 46-71, March.
    4. Gilbert Becker, 1986. "The public interest hypothesis revisited: A new test of Peltzman's theory of regulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 223-234, January.
    5. Nti, Kofi O, 1999. " Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-30, March.
    6. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-127, November.
    7. Devashish Mitra, 1999. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1116-1134, December.
    8. Irina Slinko & Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia," Economics Working Papers 0046, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    9. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June.
    10. Becker, Gary S., 1985. "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December.
    11. Border, Kim C & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 525-40, October.
    12. Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, 1998. "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government," NBER Working Papers 6789, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Di Porto, Edoardo & Persico, Nicola & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2012. "Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing," CEPR Discussion Papers 8901, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Per G. Fredriksson & Muthukumara Mani & Richard Damania, 2003. "The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures: Theory and Evidence," IMF Working Papers 03/172, International Monetary Fund.
    15. Paul Pecorino, 2009. "Public goods, group size, and the degree of rivalry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 161-169, January.
    16. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
    17. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1979. "On Coalition Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 243-54, April.
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