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Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment

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  • David K. Levine
  • Andrea Mattozzi

Abstract

We introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the ethical voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results.

Suggested Citation

  • David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi, 2020. "Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(10), pages 3298-3314, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:10:p:3298-3314
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170476
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    Cited by:

    1. David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi & Salvatore Modica, 2021. "Trade Associations: Why Not Cartels?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(1), pages 47-64, February.
    2. Juan I Block & Rohan Dutta & David K Levine, 2021. "Leaders and Social Norms: On the Emergence of Consensus or Conflict," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001758, David K. Levine.
    3. Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2018. "Interventions when Social Norms are Endogenous: A Critique," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001479, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Sascha O Becker & Thiemo Fetzer & Dennis Novy, 2017. "Who voted for Brexit? A comprehensive district-level analysis," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 32(92), pages 601-650.
    5. David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi, 2021. "Gresham's Law for Politicians," Levine's Working Paper Archive 11694000000000049, David K. Levine.
    6. David K Levine, 2019. "Radical Markets by Eric Posner and Glen Weyl: a review essay," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001522, David K. Levine.
    7. Bouton, Laurent & Ogden, Benjamin, 2017. "Ethical Voting in Multicandidate Elections," CEPR Discussion Papers 12374, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Laurent Bouton & Benjamin G. Ogden, 2017. "Group-based Voting in Multicandidate Elections," NBER Working Papers 23898, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2018. "Peer Monitoring, Ostracism and the Internalization of Social Norms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001449, David K. Levine.
    10. David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi, 2021. "Success in Contests," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001563, David K. Levine.
    11. Junze Sun & Arthur Schram & Randolph Sloof, 2019. "A Theory on Media Bias and Elections," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-048/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    12. Rohan Dutta & David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2021. "The whip and the Bible: Punishment versus internalization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 858-894, October.
    13. Johan A Elkink & Sarah Parlane & Thomas Sattler, 2020. "When one side stays home: A joint model of turnout and vote choice," Working Papers 202012, Geary Institute, University College Dublin.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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