Damned if You Do and Damned if You Don't: Two Masters
Author
Abstract
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Dutta, Rohan & Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2018. "Damned if you do and damned if you don't: Two masters," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 101-125.
References listed on IDEAS
- Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994.
"Protection for Sale,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kirchsteiger, Georg & Prat, Andrea, 2001.
"Inefficient equilibria in lobbying,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 349-375, December.
- Georg Kirchsteiger & Andrea Prat, 2001. "Inefficient equilibria in lobbying," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5901, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Persson, Torsten, 1998. "Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 310-327, March.
- Simon, Leo K & Zame, William R, 1990.
"Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 861-872, July.
- Leo K. Simon and William R. Zame., 1987. "Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Economics Working Papers 8756, University of California at Berkeley.
- Simon, Leo K. & Zame, William R., 1987. "Discontinous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8n46v2wv, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 2001.
"Conflict and Cooperation: The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common Agency,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 93-128, September.
- LAUSSEL, Didier & LE BRETON, Michel, 2001. "Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1519, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Rama, Martin & Tabellim, Guido, 1998.
"Lobbying by capital and labor over trade and labor market policies,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 1295-1316, July.
- Martín Rama & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Lobbying by Capital and Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policies," Working Papers 94, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
- Nicolas Marceau & Michael Smart, 2003.
"Corporate Lobbying and Commitment Failure in Capital Taxation,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 241-251, March.
- Nicolas Marceau & Michael Smart, 2002. "Corporate Lobbying and Commitment Failure in Capital Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series 676, CESifo.
- Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997.
"Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-769, August.
- Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Scholarly Articles 3450061, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999.
"Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
- Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1997. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 5942, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2009. "Selecting equilibria in common agency games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 604-634, March.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2018. "Interventions when Social Norms are Endogenous: A Critique," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001479, UCLA Department of Economics.
- David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi, 2020.
"Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(10), pages 3298-3314, October.
- David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi, 2020. "Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001500, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2018. "Peer Monitoring, Ostracism and the Internalization of Social Norms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001449, David K. Levine.
- Rohan Dutta & David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2021.
"The whip and the Bible: Punishment versus internalization,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 858-894, October.
- Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2020. "The Whip and the Bible: Punishment Versus Internalization," Levine's Working Paper Archive 11694000000000024, David K. Levine.
- Chu, Xiang & Liu, Jun & Ren, Long & Gong, Daqing, 2020. "Optimal contract design with a common agency in last-mile logistics," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
- Martimort, David, 2019.
""When Olson Meets Dahl": From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
13843, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Perrin Lefebvre & David Martimort, 2020. "“When Olson Meets Dahl”: From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy Making," Post-Print halshs-02875061, HAL.
- Perrin Lefebvre & David Martimort, 2020. "“When Olson Meets Dahl”: From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy Making," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02875061, HAL.
- Le Breton, Michel & Salanie, Francois, 2003. "Lobbying under political uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2589-2610, December.
- Börner, Kira, 2004. "Political Economy Reasons for Government Inertia: The Role of Interest Groups in the Case of Access to Medicines," Discussion Papers in Economics 313, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Ujhelyi, Gergely, 2009. "Campaign finance regulation with competing interest groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3-4), pages 373-391, April.
- Josip Lesica, 2018. "Lobbying For Minimum Wages," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(4), pages 2027-2057, October.
- Boerner, Kira, 2005. "Having Everyone in the Boat May Sink it - Interest Group Involvement and Policy Reforms," Discussion Papers in Economics 730, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007.
"Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(5), pages 1064-1093, September.
- Richard E. Baldwin & Frederic Robert-Nicoud, 2002. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," NBER Working Papers 8756, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," CEP Discussion Papers dp0791, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Baldwin, Richard E. & Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric, 2007. "Entry and asymmetric lobbying: why governments pick losers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19726, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Baldwin, Richard & Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric, 2006. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," CEPR Discussion Papers 5671, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kirchsteiger, Georg & Prat, Andrea, 2001.
"Inefficient equilibria in lobbying,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 349-375, December.
- Georg Kirchsteiger & Andrea Prat, 2001. "Inefficient equilibria in lobbying," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5901, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 2001.
"Conflict and Cooperation: The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common Agency,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 93-128, September.
- LAUSSEL, Didier & LE BRETON, Michel, 2001. "Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1519, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Andréa M. Maechler, 2000. "The Politics of Trade Liberalization in the Presence of FDI Incentives," Working Papers 00.09, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
- Attar, Andrea & Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Piaser, Gwenaël & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2008. "Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 75-95, July.
- Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008.
"Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 456-481, April.
- Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Ideological Uncertainty and Lobbying Competition," MPRA Paper 6992, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kirchsteiger, G. & Prat, A., 1999.
"Common Agency and Computational Complexity : Theory and Experimental Evidence,"
Discussion Paper
1999-36, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Kirchsteiger, G. & Prat, A., 1999. "Common Agency and Computational Complexity : Theory and Experimental Evidence," Other publications TiSEM c90c5691-ba3b-4d07-a8d5-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2015. "Menu Auctions and Influence Games with Private Information," MPRA Paper 62388, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- John Boyce, 2010. "Putting Foxes in Charge of the Hen-House: The Political Economy of Harvest Quota Regulations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(4), pages 475-493, August.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002.
"Political economics and public finance,"
Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659,
Elsevier.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Political Economics and Public Finance," Working Papers 149, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1999. "Political Economics and Public Finance," NBER Working Papers 7097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political Economics and Public Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2235, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2006.
"Informational lobbying and political contributions,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 631-656, May.
- Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2000. "Informational Lobbying and Political Contributions," CIE Discussion Papers 2000-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2000. "Informational Lobbying And Political Contributions," Working Papers 08-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2010.
"Sincere Lobby Formation,"
Working Papers
2072/151545, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "Sincere Lobby Formation," MPRA Paper 28249, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Didier Laussel & Michel Le Breton, 2005.
""Favors" for Sale: Strategic Analysis of a Simple Menu Auction with Adverse Selection,"
Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 6(1), pages 53-73, May.
- Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 2005. "Favors for Sale: Strategic Analysis of a Simple Menu Auction with Adverse Selection," IDEI Working Papers 361, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-2017-12-11 (Microeconomics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000001420. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: David K. Levine (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.dklevine.com/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.