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Turnout Across Democracies

Author

Listed:
  • Helios Herrera
  • Massimo Morelli
  • Salvatore Nunnari

Abstract

World democracies widely differ in legislative, executive, and legal institutions. Different institutional environments induce different mappings from electoral outcomes to the distribution of power. We explore how these mappings affect voters' participation in an election. We show that the effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voters' preferences. We uncover a novel contest effect: Given the preferences distribution, turnout increases and then decreases when we move from a more proportional to a less proportional power‐sharing system; turnout is maximized for an intermediate degree of power sharing. Moreover, we generalize the competition effect, common to models of endogenous turnout: Given the institutional environment, turnout increases in the ex ante preferences evenness, and more so when the overall system has lower power sharing. These results are robust to a wide range of modeling approaches, including ethical voter models, voter mobilization models, and rational voter models.

Suggested Citation

  • Helios Herrera & Massimo Morelli & Salvatore Nunnari, 2016. "Turnout Across Democracies," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 60(3), pages 607-624, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:60:y:2016:i:3:p:607-624
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12215
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    Cited by:

    1. Castanheira, Micael & Huck, Steffen & Leutgeb, Johannes & Schotter, Andrew, 2023. "How Trump triumphed: Multi-candidate primaries with buffoons," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    2. Alberto Grillo & Eva Raiber, 2024. "Exit Polls and Voter Turnout in the 2017 French Elections," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 75(2), pages 353-369.
    3. David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi, 2022. "Success in contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(2), pages 595-624, April.
    4. Julia Cagé, 2024. "Political Inequality," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 16(1), pages 455-490, August.
    5. Daryna Grechyna, 2024. "Technological Progress and Political Disengagement," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 66(2), pages 261-288, June.
    6. Dario Debowicz & Alejandro Saporiti & Yizhi Wang, 2021. "Redistribution, power sharing and inequality concern," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(2), pages 197-228, August.
    7. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira & Allan Drazen, 2024. "A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(662), pages 2351-2390.
    8. David K Levine, 2026. "The Largesse Design Problem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 735347000000000031, David K. Levine.
    9. Grillo, Alberto, 2019. "Voter turnout and government's legitimate mandate," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 252-265.
    10. Faravelli, Marco & Man, Priscilla & Walsh, Randall, 2015. "Mandate and paternalism: A theory of large elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 1-23.
    11. Pedro Robalo, 2021. "Political Mobilization in the Laboratory: The Role of Norms and Communication," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-40, March.
    12. Venkatesh, Raghul S, 2017. "Activism, Costly Participation, and Polarization," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 30, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    13. Arzumanyan, Mariam & Polborn, Mattias K., 2017. "Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 38-50.
    14. David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi, 2020. "Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(10), pages 3298-3314, October.
    15. Maarten C. W. Janssen & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2017. "Mystifying but not misleading: when does political ambiguity not confuse voters?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 501-524, September.
    16. Kemal Kıvanç Aköz & Alexei Zakharov, 2023. "Electoral turnout with divided opposition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 439-475, April.
    17. Shruthi Mohan Menon & Gerard Rassendren, 2022. "Analysis of determinants of voter turnout in Indian states for election years 1991–2019," Journal of Social and Economic Development, Springer;Institute for Social and Economic Change, vol. 24(1), pages 30-45, June.
    18. Bol, Damien & Matakos, Konstantinos & Troumpounis, Orestis & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2019. "Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    19. Andreas Grunewald & Emanuel Hansen & Gert Pönitzsch, 2020. "Political selection and the optimal concentration of political power," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 273-311, July.
    20. Alberto Grillo, 2023. "Political alienation and voter mobilization in elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(3), pages 515-531, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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