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Civic norms, social sanctions and voting turnout

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  • Knack, Stephen

Abstract

This study views voter participation as a collective action problem overcome chiefly by means of "solidary" and "purposive" selective incentives. It is argued that these incentives are primarily in the form of civic or societal norms, rather than special interest norms associated with partisan or group loyalties. The emphasis on civic norms is supported by positive correlations between turnout and other socially cooperative behaviors such as responding to the census, participating in PTA's, and giving to charities. Data on interpersonal pressures to vote are found to support the hypothesis that "enforcement" of voting norms via social sanctions significantly enhances turnout. The American turnout decline is interpreted in terms of a weakening of social ties adversely affecting the socialization and enforcement of norms responsible for generating civic participation.

Suggested Citation

  • Knack, Stephen, 1992. "Civic norms, social sanctions and voting turnout," MPRA Paper 28080, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28080
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    6. Abramson, Paul R. & Aldrich, John H., 1982. "The Decline of Electoral Participation in America," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 76(3), pages 502-521, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting; elections; collective action; social sanctions; free riding;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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