Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these hegemonies will be inefficiently "extractive" in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare.
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