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Survival of the Weakest: Why the West Rules

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  • Levine, David K.
  • Modica, Salvatore

Abstract

We study a model of institutions that evolve through conflict. We find that one of three configurations can emerge: an extractive hegemony, a balance of power between extractive societies or a balance of power between inclusive societies - the latter being most conducive to innovation. As extractive societies are assumed to have an advantage in head to head confrontations we refer to this latter possibility as the survival of the weakest. Our contention is that the reason that the West “rules” can be traced back to two events both taking place in China: the invention of the cannon, which made possible the survival of the weakest in Europe; and the arrival of Genghis Khan, which led to the survival of the strongest in China.

Suggested Citation

  • Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2022. "Survival of the Weakest: Why the West Rules," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 204(C), pages 394-421.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:204:y:2022:i:c:p:394-421
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.10.010
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    Cited by:

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    3. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Marcos-Prieto, Pablo, 2024. "Conflict initiation function shapes the evolution of persistent outcomes in group conflict," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    4. David K Levine, 2022. "Phoenix From the Ashes: The Evolution of Mechanism Designers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 11694000000000141, David K. Levine.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

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