Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these hegemonies will be inefficiently "extractive" in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Glenn Ellison, 2000. "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 17-45.
- Dincecco, Mark & Federico, Giovanni & Vindigni, Andrea, 2011. "Warfare, Taxation, and Political Change: Evidence from the Italian Risorgimento," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(04), pages 887-914, December.
- Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 2003.
"Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 73-96, October.
- Peyton Young, 2002. "Learning Hypothesis Testing and Nash Equilibrium," Economics Working Paper Archive 474, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Dekel, Eddie & Ely, Jeffrey & Yilankaya, Okan, 2004. "Evolution of Preferences," Microeconomics.ca working papers dekel-04-08-13-01-21-07, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 09 Jun 2006.
- Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2010. "Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1725-1758, September.
- Ingela Alger & Jörgen Weibull, 2009. "Kinship, Incentives and Evolution," Working Papers hal-00435431, HAL.
- Paul Dunne & Sam Perlo-Freeman, 2003. "The Demand for Military Spending in Developing Countries," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 23-48.
- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 1998. "Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 1797, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
- Bottazzi, Giulio & Dindo, Pietro, 2014. "Evolution and market behavior with endogenous investment rules," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 121-146.
- Giulio Bottazzi & Pietro Dindo, 2010. "Evolution and market behavior with endogenous investment rules," LEM Papers Series 2010/20, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
- Rowthorn, Robert & Seabright, Paul, 2010. "Property Rights, Warfare and the Neolithic Transition," TSE Working Papers 10-207, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Rowthorn, Robert & Seabright, Paul, 2010. "Property Rights, Warfare and the Neolithic Transition," IDEI Working Papers 654, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
- Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
- M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
- Hirshleifer,Jack, 2001. "The Dark Side of the Force," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521804127, August.
- Hirshleifer,Jack, 2001. "The Dark Side of the Force," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521009171, October.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1993. "The Dark Side of the Force," UCLA Economics Working Papers 702, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Federico Weinschelbaum & David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Felipe Zurita, 2010. "Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game," Working Papers 109, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Aug 2011.
- David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita, 2011. "Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game," Documentos de Trabajo 397, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita, 2012. "Evolving to the impatience trap: the example of the farmer-sheriff game," Working Papers 2012-033, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- David K Levine & Salvatore Modica & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita, 2011. "Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000177, David K. Levine.
- J. Paul Dunne & Sam Perlo-Freeman & Ron Smith, 2008. "The Demand For Military Expenditure In Developing Countries: Hostility Versus Capability," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(4), pages 293-302.
- J Paul Dunne & Samuel Perlo-Freeman & Ron P Smith, 2007. "The Demand for Military Expenditure in Developing Countries: Hostility versus Capability," Working Papers 0707, Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol.
- Samuel Bowles & Astrid Hopfensitz, 2000. "The Co-evolution of Individual Behaviors and Social Institutions," Working Papers 00-12-073, Santa Fe Institute.
- J. Paul Dunne & Sam Perlo-Freeman, 2003. "The demand for military spending in developing countries: A dynamic panel analysis," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(6), pages 461-474.
- Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19221. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.