Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games
No abstract is available for this item.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989.
"The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information,"
523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2058, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, David K. Levine.
- Levine, David K. & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2007. "The evolution of cooperation through imitation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 293-315, February.
- Binmore,K. & McCarthy,J. & Ponti,G. & ..., 1999.
"A backward induction experiment,"
34, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2005. "Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7630, David K. Levine.
- Frank, Robert H, 1989. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience? Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 594-96, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000480. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.