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The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring

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  • Johannes Horner
  • Wojciech Olszewski

Abstract

We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n-player games that satisfy the usual full-dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players and no public randomization device. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.
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  • Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2005. "The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 172782000000000006, www.najecon.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:najeco:172782000000000006
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