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Taxing Cash to Fight Collaborative Tax Evasion?

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We build a model of collaborative tax evasion where a buyer negotiates a price discount with a seller in exchange for not asking the receipt and paying cash, which eases tax evasion. Sellers and buyers are heterogeneous with respect to their honesty and to their cost of managing non cash payment instruments. We study the effect of two policy instruments, a tax rebate for the buyer that keeps the receipts and a tax on cash withdrawals (TCW), on tax evasion and government revenue. We find that a mix of these two instruments can reduce tax evasion and increase revenue. The TCW is effective only if sufficiently high, and it must be higher the higher the tax evasion in the country and the bigger the mass of individuals that typically pays in cash. We discuss the implementation problems of the TCW and we suggest how to partially overcome them.

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  • Giovanni Immordino & Francesco Flaviano Russo, 2014. "Taxing Cash to Fight Collaborative Tax Evasion?," CSEF Working Papers 351, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:351
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    Cited by:

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    2. Amedeo Piolatto, 2015. "Itemised Deductions: A Device to Reduce Tax Evasion," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 16(4), pages 422-438, November.
    3. Florencia Verónica Pedroni & Gabriela Pesce & Anahí Briozzo, 2022. "Inclusión financiera, medios de pago electrónicos y evasión tributaria: análisis económico y aplicación en Argentina," Apuntes del Cenes, Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, vol. 41(73), pages 171-202, February.
    4. Piolatto Amedeo, 2015. "Itemised Deductions: A Device to Reduce Tax Evasion," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 16(4), pages 422-438, December.
    5. Immordino, Giovanni & Russo, Francesco Flaviano, 2018. "Cashless payments and tax evasion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 36-43.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    collaborative tax evasion; tax on cash;

    JEL classification:

    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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