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Cashless Payments and Tax Evasion

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Abstract

Cashless payments hinder tax evasion because they build a trail for the underlying transactions. We find empirical evidence supporting this claim for Europe, showing a negative relationship between VAT evasion and the payments with credit and debit cards. We also find that using electronic cards to gather cash at ATMs, by making cash more abundant, fosters VAT evasion. Policies aimed at reducing tax evasion should therefore subsidize the direct use of electronic cards as payments, not their possession.

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  • Giovanni Immordino & Francesco Flaviano Russo, 2016. "Cashless Payments and Tax Evasion," CSEF Working Papers 445, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:445
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax evasion; electronic payments.;

    JEL classification:

    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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