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The Link between the Intrinsic Motivation to Comply and Compliance Behavior – A Critical Appraisal of Existing Evidence

  • Martin Halla

Recent economic literature emphasizes the importance of moral considerations to explain compliance behavior with respect to underground activities such as tax evasion. A considerable amount of research aims to identify factors that affect the intrinsic motivation to comply. However, the causal link between the intrinsic motivation to comply and actual compliance behavior is not established yet. We provide a discussion of the underlying identification problem and suggest (potentially) feasible empirical strategies to uncover a causal effect.

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File URL: http://www.econ.jku.at/papers/2010/wp1003.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria in its series Economics working papers with number 2010-03.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:jku:econwp:2010_03
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Web page: http://www.econ.jku.at/

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  1. Luigi Bosco & Luigi Mittone, 1994. "Tax evasion and moral constraints: some experimental evidence," Department of Economics Working Papers 9402, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  2. Martin Halla & Mario Lackner & Friedrich G. Schneider, 2009. "An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamics of the Welfare State: The Case of Benefit Morale," Economics working papers 2009-04, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
  3. Wenzel, Michael, 2005. "Motivation or rationalisation? Causal relations between ethics, norms and tax compliance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 491-508, August.
  4. Guglielmo Barone & Sauro Mocetti, 2011. "Tax morale and public spending inefficiency," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 18(6), pages 724-749, December.
  5. Elffers, Henk & Weigel, Russell H. & Hessing, Dick J., 1987. "The consequences of different strategies for measuring tax evasion behavior," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 311-337, September.
  6. Friedrich Schneider & Benno Torgler, 2007. "Shadow economy, tax morale, governance and institutional quality: A panel analysis," Economics working papers 2007-01, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
  7. repec:att:wimass:9610 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Friedrich Schneider & Andreas Buehn & Claudio E. Montenegro, 2010. "Shadow Economies All over the World: New Estimates for 162 Countries from 1999 to 2007," Working Papers wp322, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
  9. Heinemann, Friedrich, 2007. "Is the Welfare State Self-destructive? A Study of Government Benefit Morale," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-029, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  10. Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider, 2007. "The Impact of Tax Morale and Institutional Quality on the Shadow Economy," CESifo Working Paper Series 1899, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Michael P. Murray, 2006. "Avoiding Invalid Instruments and Coping with Weak Instruments," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 111-132, Fall.
  12. Joshua Angrist & Alan Krueger, 2001. "Instrumental Variables and the Search for Identification: From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments," Working Papers 834, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  13. James Alm & Benno Torgler, 2004. "Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the United States and in Europe," CREMA Working Paper Series 2004-14, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  14. Gordon, James P. P., 1989. "Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 797-805, April.
  15. Halla, Martin & Schneider, Friedrich, 2008. "Taxes and Benefits: Two Distinct Options to Cheat on the State?," IZA Discussion Papers 3536, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  16. Panayiota Lyssiotou & Panos Pashardes & Thanasis Stengos, 2004. "Estimates of the black economy based on consumer demand approaches," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(497), pages 622-640, 07.
  17. Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, 1994. "Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
  18. Posner, Richard A, 1997. "Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 365-69, May.
  19. Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996. "Tax Compliance," Working papers 9610r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  20. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
  21. Torgler, Benno, 2005. "Tax morale and direct democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 525-531, June.
  22. Benno Torgler, 2005. "Tax morale in Latin America," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 133-157, January.
  23. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-79, April.
  24. Benno Torgler & Markus Schaffner & Alison Macintyre, 2007. "Tax Compliance, Tax Morale, and Governance Quality," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0727, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  25. Tanzi, Vito, 1999. "Uses and Abuses of Estimates of the Underground Economy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(456), pages F338-47, June.
  26. Trevor Breusch, 2005. "Estimating the Underground Economy using MIMIC Models," Econometrics 0507003, EconWPA, revised 25 Jul 2005.
  27. Dominik H. Enste & Friedrich Schneider, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March.
  28. Lemieux, Thomas & Fortin, Bernard & Frechette, Pierre, 1994. "The Effect of Taxes on Labor Supply in the Underground Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 231-54, March.
  29. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470 Elsevier.
  30. Traxler, Christian, 2006. "Social Norms and Conditional Cooperative Taxpayers," Discussion Papers in Economics 1202, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  31. Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
  32. Joel Slemrod, 2007. "Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 25-48, Winter.
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