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Tax evasion in a behaviorally heterogeneous society: An evolutionary analysis


  • Antoci, Angelo
  • Russu, Paolo
  • Zarri, Luca


We focus on the tax evasion dynamics emerging from repeated interaction of three types of taxpayers: cheaters, honest citizens and punishers. By assuming that cultural evolution is driven by material payoffs only, we show that a long overlooked behavioral attitude towards taxation such as tax morale is important to dynamically induce higher levels of tax compliance within a large-scale population. The results of our evolutionary analysis reveal that the presence of taxpayers who both act honestly in the first place and are willing to costly sanction cheaters plays an important role for the long-run success of the social battle against tax evasion.

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  • Antoci, Angelo & Russu, Paolo & Zarri, Luca, 2014. "Tax evasion in a behaviorally heterogeneous society: An evolutionary analysis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 106-115.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:42:y:2014:i:c:p:106-115 DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2014.06.002

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    Cited by:

    1. Sanz-Sanz, José Félix, 2016. "The Laffer curve in schedular multi-rate income taxes with non-genuine allowances: An application to Spain," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 42-56.
    2. Aurélie Bonein & Cécile Bazart, 2017. "The Strength of the Symbol: Are we Willing to Punish Evaders ?," Working Papers 17-02, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier.


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