IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Free riders and strong reciprocators coexist in public goods experiments: evolutionary foundations


  • Angelo Antoci

    () (Dipartimento di Economia, Impresa e Regolamentazione, University of Sassari)

  • Paolo Russu

    () (Dipartimento di Economia, Impresa e Regolamentazione, University of Sassari)

  • Luca Zarri

    () (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, University of Verona)


Experimental evidence indicates that free riders and strongly reciprocal papers coexist in the public goods game framework. By means of an evolutionary analysis, we provide an endogenization of this behavioral regularity.

Suggested Citation

  • Angelo Antoci & Paolo Russu & Luca Zarri, 2010. "Free riders and strong reciprocators coexist in public goods experiments: evolutionary foundations," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 720-733.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00509

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Antoci, Angelo & Russu, Paolo & Zarri, Luca, 2014. "Tax evasion in a behaviorally heterogeneous society: An evolutionary analysis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 106-115.

    More about this item


    Free Riding; Cooperation; Strong Reciprocity; Public Goods Game; Evolutionary Game Theory.;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00509. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.