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New Insights into Conditional Cooperation and Punishment from a Strategy Method Experiment

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  • Cheung, Stephen L.

Abstract

This paper introduces new experimental designs to examine how conditional cooperation and punishment behaviours respond to the full range of variation in the contributions of others. It is shown that contributions become significantly more selfish-biased as others contribute more unequally, while punishment increases both with decreasing contributions by the target player and increasing contributions by a third player. Low contributors who punish antisocially do not direct their punishment specifically toward high contributors, while their beliefs indicate that they expect to themselves be punished.

Suggested Citation

  • Cheung, Stephen L., 2012. "New Insights into Conditional Cooperation and Punishment from a Strategy Method Experiment," Working Papers 2012-01, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/8089
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Thöni, 2014. "Inequality aversion and antisocial punishment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 529-545, April.
    2. Hartig, Björn & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Kölle, Felix, 2015. "Conditioning on what? Heterogeneous contributions and conditional cooperation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 48-64.
    3. repec:kap:expeco:v:20:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10683-017-9517-4 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Urs Fischbacher & Simeon Schudy & Sabrina Teyssier, 2014. "Heterogeneous reactions to heterogeneity in returns from public goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 195-217, June.
    5. Dariel A., 2013. "Cooperation preferences and framing effects," Research Memorandum 010, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    6. Francesco Fallucchi & R. Andrew Luccasen & Theodore L. Turocy, 2017. "Behavioural types in public goods games: A re-analysis by hierarchical clutering," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 17-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    7. Lenka Fiala & Sigrid Suetens, 2017. "Transparency and cooperation in repeated dilemma games: a meta study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(4), pages 755-771, December.
    8. Irenaeus Wolff, 2016. "What are the equilibria in linear public-good experiments?," TWI Research Paper Series 105, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    9. Francesco Fallucchi & R. Andrew Luccasen & Theodore L. Turocy, 2017. "Behavioural types in public goods games: A re-analysis by hierarchical clutering," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 17-01R, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

    More about this item

    Keywords

    strategy method; punishment; conditional cooperation; selfish bias;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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