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Income Tax Evasion Dynamics: Evidence from an Agent-based Econophysics Model

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  • Michael Pickhardt
  • Goetz Seibold

Abstract

We analyze income tax evasion dynamics in a standard model of statistical mechanics, the Ising model of ferromagnetism. However, in contrast to previous research, we use an inhomogeneous multi-dimensional Ising model where the local degrees of freedom (agents) are subject to a specific social temperature and coupled to external fields which govern their social behavior. This new modeling frame allows for analyzing large societies of four different and interacting agent types. As a second novelty, our model may reproduce results from agent-based models that incorporate standard Allingham and Sandmo tax evasion features as well as results from existing two-dimensional Ising based tax evasion models. We then use our model for analyzing income tax evasion dynamics under different enforcement scenarios and point to some policy implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Pickhardt & Goetz Seibold, 2011. "Income Tax Evasion Dynamics: Evidence from an Agent-based Econophysics Model," Papers 1112.0233, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1112.0233
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pickhardt, Michael & Prinz, Aloys, 2014. "Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion – A survey," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-19.
    2. repec:sae:pubfin:v:45:y:2017:i:6:p:771-791 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Gao, Li, 2015. "Evolution of consumption distribution and model of wealth distribution in China between 1995 and 2012," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 429(C), pages 76-86.
    4. Dino Rizzi, 2017. "Tax Evasion Indices and Profiles," Public Finance Review, , vol. 45(6), pages 771-791, November.
    5. Pellizzari, Paolo & Rizzi, Dino, 2014. "Citizenship and power in an agent-based model of tax compliance with public expenditure," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 35-48.
    6. Sascha Hokamp & Götz Seibold, 2014. "Tax Compliance and Public Goods Provision. An Agent-based Econophysics Approach," Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, CEJEME, vol. 6(4), pages 217-236, December.
    7. Semjén, András, 2017. "Az adózói magatartás különféle magyarázatai
      [Various explanations for tax compliance]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 140-184.
    8. Fry, John & Cheah, Eng-Tuck, 2016. "Negative bubbles and shocks in cryptocurrency markets," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 343-352.
    9. Hokamp, Sascha, 2014. "Dynamics of tax evasion with back auditing, social norm updating, and public goods provision – An agent-based simulation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 187-199.
    10. Jovanovic, Franck & Schinckus, Christophe, 2017. "Econophysics and Financial Economics: An Emerging Dialogue," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780190205034.
    11. Rao, R. Kavita & Tandon, Suranjali, 2016. "Revisiting the tax compliance problem using prospect theory," Working Papers 16/169, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
    12. Georgia Kaplanoglou & Vassilis T. Rapanos & Nikolaos Daskalakis, 2016. "Tax compliance behaviour during the crisis: the case of Greek SMEs," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 405-444, December.
    13. R.Kavita Rao & Suranjali Tandon, 2016. "Revisiting the Tax Compliance Problem using Prospect Theory," Working Papers id:11225, eSocialSciences.
    14. Laszlo Gulyas & Tamás Mahr & Istvan Janos Toth, 2015. "Factors to Curb Tax Evasion: Evidences from the TAXSIM Agent-Based Simulation Model," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1521, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General

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