Analysing tax evasion dynamics via the Ising model
We develop a model of tax evasion based on the Ising model. We augment the model using an appropriate enforcement mechanism that may allow policy makers to curb tax evasion. With a certain probability tax evaders are subject to an audit. If they get caught they behave honestly for a certain number of periods. Simulating the model for a range of parameter combinations, we show that tax evasion may be controlled effectively by using punishment as an enforcement mechanism.
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Volume (Year): 4 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
- Zaklan, Georg & Lima, F.W.S. & Westerhoff, Frank, 2008. "Controlling tax evasion fluctuations," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 387(23), pages 5857-5861.
- Joel Slemrod, 2007. "Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 25-48, Winter.
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