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Tax Morale and Tax Evasion: Social Preferences and Bounded Rationality

Author

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  • Zsombor Z. Meder

    (Maastricht University Department of Economics)

  • Andras Simonovits

    (Institute of Economics Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Budapest University of Technology and Economics Institute of Mathematics and Central European University, Department of Economics)

  • Janos Vincze

    (Institute of Economics Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Corvinus University of Budapest)

Abstract

We study a family of models of tax evasion, where a flat-rate tax finances only the provision of public goods, neglecting audits and wage differences. We focus on the comparison of two modeling approaches. The first is based on optimizing agents, who are endowed with social preferences, their utility being the sum of private consumption and moral utility. The second approach involves agents acting according to simple heuristics. We find that while we encounter the traditionally shaped Laffer-curve in the optimizing model, the heuristics models exhibit (linearly) increasing Laffer-curves. This difference is related to a peculiar type of behavior emerging within the heuristics based approach: a number of agents lurk in a moral state of limbo, alternating between altruism and selfishness.

Suggested Citation

  • Zsombor Z. Meder & Andras Simonovits & Janos Vincze, 2012. "Tax Morale and Tax Evasion: Social Preferences and Bounded Rationality," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1203, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:1203
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pickhardt, Michael & Seibold, Goetz, 2014. "Income tax evasion dynamics: Evidence from an agent-based econophysics model," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 147-160.
    2. Balázs Király & András Simonovits, 2019. "Learning to save in a voluntary pension system: toward an agent-based model," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 14(1), pages 121-145, March.
    3. Balazs Kiraly & Andras Simonovits, 2016. "Saving and taxation in a voluntary pension system: Toward an agent-based model," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1606, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    4. Nikolaos Varotsis & Ioannis Katerelos, 2020. "Tax behaviour relating to the review of a revised regional tax policy: a study in Greece," Journal of Economic Structures, Springer;Pan-Pacific Association of Input-Output Studies (PAPAIOS), vol. 9(1), pages 1-16, December.
    5. Garay, Barnabás M. & Simonovits, András & Tóth, János, 2012. "Local interaction in tax evasion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 412-415.
    6. Sascha Hokamp & Götz Seibold, 2014. "Tax Compliance and Public Goods Provision. An Agent-based Econophysics Approach," Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, vol. 6(4), pages 217-236, December.
    7. d’Andria, D. & Savin, I., 2018. "A Win-Win-Win? Motivating innovation in a knowledge economy with tax incentives," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 38-56.
    8. Andras Simonovits, 2013. "Does Higher Tax Morale Imply Higher Optimal Labor Income Tax Rate?," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 2, pages 97-114, June.
    9. Barnabas M. Garay & Andras Simonovits & Janos Toth, 2011. "Local Interaction in Tax Evasion," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1104, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    10. Laszlo Gulyas & Tamás Mahr & Istvan Janos Toth, 2015. "Factors to Curb Tax Evasion: Evidences from the TAXSIM Agent-Based Simulation Model," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1521, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax evasion; tax morale; agent-based simulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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