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On the evolutionary stability of preferences for reciprocity

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  • Guttman, Joel M.

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  • Guttman, Joel M., 2000. "On the evolutionary stability of preferences for reciprocity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 31-50, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:16:y:2000:i:1:p:31-50
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    1. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1995. "Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-18, February.
    2. Werner Raub, 1990. "A General Game-Theoretic Model of Preference Adaptations in Problematic Social Situations," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(1), pages 67-93, January.
    3. Frank, Robert H, 1987. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 593-604, September.
    4. Dekel, Eddie & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1992. "On the evolution of optimizing behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 392-406, August.
    5. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
    6. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
    7. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
    8. Amartya K. Sen, 1967. "Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 81(1), pages 112-124.
    9. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
    10. W. Guth & R. Schmittberger & B. Schwartz, 2010. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 291, David K. Levine.
    11. Axelrod, Robert, 1981. "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 306-318, June.
    12. Guttman, Joel M., 1996. "Rational actors, tit-for-tat types, and the evolution of cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 27-56, January.
    13. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 1994. "Competition Or Co-Operation: On The Evolutionary Economics Of Trust, Exploitation And Moral Attitudes," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 155-187, June.
    14. Guttman, Joel M., 1986. "Matching behavior and collective action : Some experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 171-198, June.
    15. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Timothy Besley & Timothy W. Guinnane, 1994. "Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(2), pages 491-515.
    16. Conlisk, John, 1980. "Costly optimizers versus cheap imitators," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 275-293, September.
    17. Stahl Dale O., 1993. "Evolution of Smartn Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 604-617, October.
    18. Hansson, Ingemar & Stuart, Charles, 1990. "Malthusian Selection of Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 529-544, June.
    19. Rubin, Paul H & Paul, Chris W, II, 1979. "An Evolutionary Model of Taste for Risk," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 17(4), pages 585-596, October.
    20. W. Güth & S. Nitzan, 1997. "The Evolutionary Stability of Moral Objections to Free Riding," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(2), pages 133-149, July.
    21. A. C. Hoggatt, 1969. "Response of Paid Student Subjects to Differential Behaviour of Robots in Bifurcated Duopoly Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 36(4), pages 417-432.
    22. Nachbar, John H., 1992. "Evolution in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 307-326, December.
    23. Juan Carlos Martinez Coll & Jack Hirshleifer, 1991. "The Limits of Reciprocity," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(1), pages 35-64, January.
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