IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/poleco/v27y2011i1p120-131.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Referendums, trust, and tax evasion

Author

Listed:
  • Hug, Simon
  • Spörri, Franziska

Abstract

Countries engaged in transitions from Communist rule to democracy and market economies face a considerable challenge to foster tax morale and to reduce tax evasion. Tax evasion, however, severely limits the capacities of these reformed states, which reduces in a vicious circle the citizens' incentives to pay taxes. The question then arises how this vicious circle may be broken. Several authors suggest that political institutions may do the trick. Based on insights that institutions allowing a direct say on policy issues (especially tax questions) may increase tax morale, we propose to study comparatively how the link between trust and tax morale is affected by these institutions. We find that allowing for referendums strengthens the link between trust and tax morale, but that this effect depends on the nature of the institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Hug, Simon & Spörri, Franziska, 2011. "Referendums, trust, and tax evasion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 120-131, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:1:p:120-131
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176-2680(10)00046-7
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kiewiet, D Roderick & Szakaly, Kristin, 1996. "Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 62-97, April.
    2. Bénédicte Vidaillet & V. D'Estaintot & P. Abécassis, 2005. "Introduction," Post-Print hal-00287137, HAL.
    3. Steunenberg, Bernard, 1992. "Referendum, Initiative, and Veto Power: Budgetary Decision Making in Local Government," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 501-529.
    4. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2006. "Tax Evasion in Switzerland: The Roles of Deterrence and Tax Morale," IEW - Working Papers 284, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    5. Franzese, Robert J., 2005. "Empirical Strategies for Various Manifestations of Multilevel Data," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(04), pages 430-446, September.
    6. Benno Torgler, 2003. "Tax Morale in Transition Countries," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 357-381.
    7. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2002. "Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 87-99, July.
    8. Torgler, Benno, 2003. "To evade taxes or not to evade: that is the question," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 283-302, July.
    9. Benno Torgler, 2003. "Tax Morale, Rule-Governed Behaviour and Trust," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 119-140, June.
    10. Feld, Lars P & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2002. "Tax Evasion and Voting: An Experimental Analysis," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 197-222.
    11. Alm, James & Torgler, Benno, 2006. "Culture differences and tax morale in the United States and in Europe," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 224-246, April.
    12. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    13. Pommerehne, Werner W & Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, 1996. "Tax Rates, Tax Administration and Income Tax Evasion in Switzerland," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 88(1-2), pages 161-170, July.
    14. Schneider, Friedrich, 2002. "The Size and Development of the Shadow Economies of 22 Transition and 21 OECD Countries," IZA Discussion Papers 514, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    15. Tomz, Michael & Wittenberg, Jason & King, Gary, 2003. "Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results," Journal of Statistical Software, Foundation for Open Access Statistics, vol. 8(i01).
    16. Kedar, Orit & Shively, W. Phillips, 2005. "Introduction to the Special Issue," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(04), pages 297-300, September.
    17. Josef C. Brada, 1996. "Privatization Is Transition--Or Is It?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 67-86, Spring.
    18. Frey, Bruno S, 1997. "A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1043-1053, July.
    19. Achen, Christopher H., 2005. "Two-Step Hierarchical Estimation: Beyond Regression Analysis," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(04), pages 447-456, September.
    20. Lewis, Jeffrey B. & Linzer, Drew A., 2005. "Estimating Regression Models in Which the Dependent Variable Is Based on Estimates," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(04), pages 345-364, September.
    21. Bruno S. Frey & Lars P. Feld, 2002. "Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 760, CESifo Group Munich.
    22. Pommerehne, Werner W. & Frey, Bruno S., 1992. "The effects of tax administration on tax morale," Discussion Papers, Series II 191, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    23. Torgler, Benno, 2005. "Tax morale and direct democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 525-531, June.
    24. Matsusaka, John G., 2004. "For the Many or the Few," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226510811, January-M.
    25. Pommerehne, Werner W & Hart, Albert & Frey, Bruno S, 1994. "Tax Morale, Tax Evasion and the Choice of Policy Instruments in Different Political Systems," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 49(Supplemen), pages 52-69.
    26. Matsusaka, John G & McCarty, Nolan M, 2001. "Political Resource Allocation: Benefits and Costs of Voter Initiatives," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 413-448, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Colin C. Williams & Ioana A. Horodnic, 2015. "Explaining and tackling the shadow economy in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: a tax morale approach," Baltic Journal of Economics, Baltic International Centre for Economic Policy Studies, vol. 15(2), pages 81-98.
    2. Cyan, Musharraf R. & Koumpias, Antonios M. & Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge, 2016. "The determinants of tax morale in Pakistan," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 23-34.
    3. Bazart, C. & Bonein, A., 2014. "Reciprocal relationships in tax compliance decisions," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 83-102.
    4. Russo, Francesco Flaviano, 2013. "Tax morale and tax evasion reports," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 110-114.
    5. d'Agostino, Giorgio & Scarlato, Margherita, 2012. "Inclusive Institutions, Innovation and Economic Growth: Estimates for European Countries," MPRA Paper 43098, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Djanali, Iwan & Sheehan-Connor, Damien, 2012. "Tax affinity hypothesis: Do we really hate paying taxes?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 758-775.
    7. Colin C. Williams, 2014. "Confronting the Shadow Economy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15370.
    8. Colin C. Williams & Ioana A. Horodnic, 2015. "Who Participates in the Undeclared Economy in South-Eastern Europe? An Evaluation of the Marginalization Thesis," South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics, Association of Economic Universities of South and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea Region, vol. 13(2), pages 157-175.
    9. repec:prg:jnlefa:v:2017:y:2017:i:4:id:197:p:05-18 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Désirée Teobaldelli & Friedrich Schneider, 2013. "The influence of direct democracy on the shadow economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 543-567, December.
    11. Libman, Alexander, 2012. "Перераспределительные Конфликты И Факторы Культуры В Новой Политической Экономии
      [Redistributive Conflicts and Culture in the New Political Economy]
      ," MPRA Paper 48192, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Thomas Coisnon & Damien Rousselie`re & Samira Rousselie`re, 2018. "Information on biodiversity and environmental behaviors: a European study of individual and institutional drivers to adopt sustainable gardening practices," Working Papers SMART - LERECO 18-02, INRA UMR SMART-LERECO.
    13. Ali, Merima & Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge & Sjursen, Ingrid Hoem, 2014. "To Pay or Not to Pay? Citizens’ Attitudes Toward Taxation in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and South Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 828-842.
    14. Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada & Gërxhani, Klarita, 2016. "Tax evasion and well-being: A study of the social and institutional context in Central and Eastern Europe," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(S), pages 149-159.
    15. Maurizio Bovi & Roy Cerqueti, 2014. "A quantitative view on policymakers’ goal, institutions and tax evasion," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 1493-1510, May.
    16. Alexander Libman, 2015. "Words or deeds: what matters? On the role of symbolic action in political decentralization," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 801-838, November.
    17. Raitano, Michele & Fantozzi, Roberto, 2015. "Political cycle and reported labour incomes in Italy: Quasi-experimental evidence on tax evasion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 269-280.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:1:p:120-131. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.