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Joint tax evasion

Author

Listed:
  • Robin Boadway
  • Nicolas Marceau
  • Steeve Mongrain

Abstract

Tax evasion analysis typically assumes that evasion involves individual taxpayers responding to some given policies. However, evading taxes could require the collaboration of at least two taxpayers. Detection depends on the costly avoidance activities of both transacting partners. An increase in sanctions leads to a direct increase in the expected cost of a transaction in the illegal sector, but it may also increase the incentive for the partners to cooperate in avoiding detection. The total cost of transacting in the illegal sector can fall, and tax evasion may increase. The policy implications of this phenomenon are considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Robin Boadway & Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2002. "Joint tax evasion," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 35(3), pages 417-435, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:35:y:2002:i:3:p:417-435
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Loukas Balafoutas & Adrian Beck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2014. "The Hidden Costs of Tax Evasion - Collaborative Tax Evasion in Markets for Expert Services," Working Papers 2014-01, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
    2. repec:spr:epolit:v:34:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s40888-016-0043-1 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Rotondi, Valentina & Stanca, Luca, 2015. "The effect of particularism on corruption: Theory and empirical evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 219-235.
    4. Giovanni Immordino & Francesco Flaviano Russo, 2014. "Taxing Cash to Fight Collaborative Tax Evasion?," CSEF Working Papers 351, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    5. Balafoutas, Loukas & Beck, Adrian & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Sutter, Matthias, 2015. "The hidden costs of tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 14-25.
    6. Mariana Gerstenblüth & Natalia Melgar & Juan Pablo Pagano & Máximo Rossi, 2008. "Threats in Latin American and Caribbean countries: how do inequality and the asymmetries of rules affect tax morale?," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1408, Department of Economics - dECON.
    7. Buccirossi, Paolo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2006. "Leniency policies and illegal transactions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1281-1297, August.
    8. Marcelo Arbex & Enlinson Mattos, 2015. "Optimal sales tax rebates and tax enforcement consumers," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 479-493.
    9. Giovanni Immordino & Francesco Flaviano Russo, 2016. "Cashless Payments and Tax Evasion," CSEF Working Papers 445, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    10. Alejandro Esteller-More, 2004. "Tax Evasion in Interrelated Taxes," Public Economics 0401001, EconWPA.
    11. Marcelo Arbex & Enlinson Mattos & Laudo M. Ogura, 2015. "Welfare and Inequality with Hard-to-Tax Markets," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 71(3), pages 371-384, September.
    12. Busato; Francesco & Bruno Chiarini & Vincenzo di Maro, 2005. "Directional Congestion and Regime Switching in a Long Memory Model for Electricity Prices," Economics Working Papers 2005-19, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    13. Juan Prieto Rodríguez & María José Sanzo Pérez & Javier Suárez Pandiello, 2006. "Economic analysis of attitudes towards fiscal fraud in Spain”," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 177(2), pages 107-128, April.
    14. repec:spr:joecth:v:63:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-016-0976-1 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Odd Erik Nygård & Joel Slemrod & Thor Olav Thoresen, 2016. "Distributional Implications of Joint Tax Evasion," CESifo Working Paper Series 5915, CESifo Group Munich.
    16. Philip Curry & Steeve Mongrain, "undated". "What You Don't See Can't Hurt You: An Economic Analysis of," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1062, American Law & Economics Association.
    17. Martin Abraham & Kerstin Lorek & Friedemann Richter & Matthias Wrede, 2017. "Collusive tax evasion and social norms," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(2), pages 179-197, April.
    18. Mustafa Besim & Glenn Jenkins, 2005. "Tax compliance: when do employees behave like the self-employed?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(10), pages 1201-1208.
    19. Mariana Gerstenbluth & Natalia Melgar & Juan Pablo Pagano & Maximo Rossi, 2012. "How do inequality affect tax morale in Latin America and Caribbean?," REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA DEL ROSARIO, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO, December.
    20. Juan Prieto-Rodriguez & Maria Jose Sanzo-Perez & Javier Suarez-Pandiello, 2005. "Análisis económico de la actitud hacia el fraude fiscal en España," Public Economics 0502005, EconWPA.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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