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Moral Hazard, Income Taxation, and Prospect Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Ravi Kanbur
  • Jukka Pirttilä
  • Matti Tuomala

    (School of Management, University of Tampere)

Abstract

The standard theory of optimal income taxation under uncertainty has been developed under the assumption that individuals maximize expected utility. However, prospect theory has now been established as an alternative model of individual behaviour, with empirical support. This paper explores the theory of optimal income taxation under uncertainty when individuals behave according to the tenets of prospect theory. It is seen that many of the standard results are either overturned, or modified in interesting ways. The validity of the First Order Approach requires new conditions that are developed in the paper. And when these conditions are valid, it is shown that optimal marginal tax rates on low incomes will tend to be lower under prospect theory than under expected utility theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Ravi Kanbur & Jukka Pirttilä & Matti Tuomala, 2004. "Moral Hazard, Income Taxation, and Prospect Theory," Working Papers 0430, Tampere University, Faculty of Management and Business, Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:tam:wpaper:0430
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    File URL: http://urn.fi/urn:isbn:951-44-5941-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Amedeo Piolatto & Gwenola Trotin, 2016. "Optimal Income Tax Enforcement under Prospect Theory," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 29-41, February.
    2. Keisuke Morita, 2015. "Advance Tax Payments And Tax Evasion: A Note," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 60(05), pages 1-10, December.
    3. Nguyen, Hang T. T., 2024. "Corporate taxation and total factor productivity: Evidence on a non-linear relationship," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 284, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    4. Mehrmann, Annika & Sureth-Sloane, Caren, 2017. "Tax loss offset restrictions and biased perception of risky investments," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 222, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    5. Hsu, Minchung & Yang, C.C., 2013. "Optimal linear and two-bracket income taxes with idiosyncratic earnings risk," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 58-71.
    6. Rablen, Matthew D., 2010. "Performance targets, effort and risk-taking," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 687-697, August.
    7. Alex Rees-Jones & Dmitry Taubinsky, 2018. "Taxing Humans: Pitfalls of the Mechanism Design Approach and Potential Resolutions," Tax Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 107-133.
    8. Amit Kothiyal & Vitalie Spinu & Peter Wakker, 2011. "Prospect theory for continuous distributions: A preference foundation," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 195-210, June.
    9. Marcelo Arbex & Enlinson Mattos, 2010. "Poverty and the Optimal General Income Tax-cum-Audit Policy," Working Papers 02-2010, Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto.
    10. Heutel, Garth, 2019. "Prospect theory and energy efficiency," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 236-254.
    11. Becker, Johannes & Hopp, Daniel & Kriebel, Michael, 2020. "Mental accounting of public funds – The flypaper effect in the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 321-336.
    12. Xianhua Dai, 2011. "Optimal Taxation under Income Uncertainty," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 12(1), pages 121-138, May.
    13. Ravi Kanbur & Jukka Pirttilä & Matti Tuomala, 2006. "Non‐Welfarist Optimal Taxation And Behavioural Public Economics," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 849-868, December.
    14. Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato, 2011. "Optimal Income Taxation with Uncertain Earnings: A Synthesis," CESifo Working Paper Series 3654, CESifo.
    15. Gwenola Trotin & Amedeo Piolatto, 2011. "Optimal tax enforcement under prospect theory," Working Papers. Serie AD 2011-24, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    16. Charité, Jimmy & Fisman, Raymond & Kuziemko, Ilyana & Zhang, Kewei, 2022. "Reference points and redistributive preferences: Experimental evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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