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Non-cooperative game theory


  • Giacomo Bonanno

    (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)


This is the first draft of the entry ?Game Theory? to appear in the Sage Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Science (edited by Ian Jarvie & Jesús Zamora Bonilla), Part III, Chapter 16.

Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 86, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:08-6

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Aumann, Robert J., 1996. "Reply to Binmore," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 138-146, November.
    2. Bonanno, Giacomo, 1991. "The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(01), pages 37-65, April.
    3. Samet, Dov, 1996. "Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 230-251, December.
    4. Binmore, Ken, 1996. "A Note on Backward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 135-137, November.
    5. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2004. "Memory and perfect recall in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 237-256, May.
    6. Philip J. Reny, 1992. "Rationality in Extensive-Form Games," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 103-118, Fall.
    7. Pradeep Dubey, 1986. "Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 11(1), pages 1-8, February.
    8. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2001. "Substantive Rationality and Backward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 425-435, November.
    9. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1999. "Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 149-225, June.
    10. Stalnaker, Robert, 1998. "Belief revision in games: forward and backward induction1," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 31-56, July.
    11. Harry W. Richardson & Peter Gordon & James E. Moore, 2007. "Introduction," Chapters,in: The Economic Costs and Consequences of Terrorism, chapter 1 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. N/A, 1996. "Note:," Foreign Trade Review, , vol. 31(1-2), pages 1-1, January.
    13. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796, June.
    14. Adam Brandenburger, 2007. "The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(4), pages 465-492, April.
    15. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
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    More about this item


    game theory; epstemic foundations; incomplete information; epstemic foundations; incomplete information;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory


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