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Politics and Economics in the Eighties

Author

Listed:
  • Alberto Alesina
  • Geoffrey Carliner

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Alesina & Geoffrey Carliner, 1991. "Politics and Economics in the Eighties," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number ales91-1.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberbk:ales91-1
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mian, Atif & Sufi, Amir & Trebbi, Francesco, 2013. "The Political Economy of the Subprime Mortgage Credit Expansion," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 8(4), pages 373-408, October.
    2. Levent Celik & Bilgehan Karabay & John McLaren, 2015. "When Is It Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-Track Authority," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 347-389, August.
    3. Philip Keefer, 2002. "Politics and the Determinants of Banking Crises: The Effects of Political Checks and Balances," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.), Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 3, pages 085-112 Central Bank of Chile.
    4. Finn Martensen, 2014. "Routinization and the Decline of the U.S. Minimum Wage," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2014-16, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    5. Stanley Winer & Michael Tofias & Bernard Grofman & John Aldrich, 2008. "Trending economic factors and the structure of Congress in the growth of government, 1930–2002," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 415-448, June.
    6. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," NBER Chapters,in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 233-272 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001. "International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 16(33), pages 407-432, October.
    8. Reeder, Richard J. & Calhoun, Samuel D., 2001. "Federal Funding in the South: Bringing Home the Bacon, but Where's the Beef?," The Review of Regional Studies, Southern Regional Science Association, vol. 31(1), pages 1-12, Summer.
    9. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," NBER Working Papers 7582, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2010. "The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 1967-1998, December.
    11. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," CRSP working papers 512, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    12. Calomiris, Charles W. & Flandreau, Marc & Laeven, Luc, 2016. "Political foundations of the lender of last resort: A global historical narrative," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 48-65.
    13. Jones, Mark P. & Sanguinetti, Pablo & Tommasi, Mariano, 2000. "Politics, institutions, and fiscal performance in a federal system: an analysis of the Argentine provinces," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 305-333, April.
    14. Keefer, Philip, 2001. "When do special interests run rampant ? disentangling the role in banking crises of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2543, The World Bank.
    15. Alberto Alesina, 2000. "The Political Economy of the Budget Surplus in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 3-19, Summer.
    16. Behn, Markus & Haselmann, Rainer & Kick, Thomas & Vig, Vikrant, 2015. "The political economy of bank bailouts," IMFS Working Paper Series 86, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    17. Keefer, Philip, 2004. "Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3439, The World Bank.
    18. von Hagen, Jürgen, 1998. "Budgeting institutions for aggregate fiscal discipline," ZEI Working Papers B 01-1998, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    19. Robert K. Fleck, 2008. "Voter Influence and Big Policy Change: The Positive Political Economy of the New Deal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(1), pages 1-37, February.
    20. Silvia Fedeli & Francesco Forte, 2011. "A survival analysis of the circulation of the political elites governing Italy from 1861 to 1994," Working Papers 141, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
    21. Derek Hung Chiat Chen, 2003. "Intertemporal excess burden, bequest motives, and the budget deficit," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3086, The World Bank.
    22. Takatoshi Ito, 1993. "U.S. Political Pressure and Economic Liberalization in East Asia," NBER Chapters,in: Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia, pages 391-422 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Randall S. Kroszner, 2000. "The economics and politics of financial modernization," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 25-37.
    24. Robert Boyer, 1998. "De « La Théorie Générale » à la Nouvelle Économie Classique : Une réflexion sur la nouveauté en macroéconomie," Cahiers d'Économie Politique, Programme National Persée, vol. 33(1), pages 7-56.

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