Political Foundations of the Thrift Debacle
In: Politics and Economics in the Eighties
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- Calomiris, Charles W. & Flandreau, Marc & Laeven, Luc, 2016.
"Political foundations of the lender of last resort: A global historical narrative,"
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- Colburn, Christopher B. & Hudgins, Sylvia C., 1996. "The influence on Congress by the thrift industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 473-494, April.
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