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Political Foundations Of The Thrift Debacle

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  • ROMER, T.
  • WEINGAST, B.R.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Romer, T. & Weingast, B.R., 1990. "Political Foundations Of The Thrift Debacle," GSIA Working Papers 1990-14, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  • Handle: RePEc:cmu:gsiawp:1990-14
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. Dan Brumbaugh & Robert E. Litan, 1990. "The Banks Are Worse off than You Think," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(1), pages 4-12, January.
    2. Kane, Edward J, 1989. "The High Cost of Incompletely Funding the FSLIC Shortage of Explicit Capital," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 31-47, Fall.
    3. R. Dan Brumbaugh, JR. & Andrew S. Carron & Robert E. Litan, 1989. "Cleaning Up the Depository Institutions Mess," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1), pages 243-296.
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    Cited by:

    1. Brock, Philip L, 2000. "Financial Safety Nets: Lessons from Chile," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 15(1), pages 69-84, February.
    2. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 233-272, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001. "International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 16(33), pages 408-432.
    4. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2010. "The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 1967-1998, December.
    5. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," CRSP working papers 512, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    6. Calomiris, Charles W. & Flandreau, Marc & Laeven, Luc, 2016. "Political foundations of the lender of last resort: A global historical narrative," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 48-65.
    7. Keefer, Philip, 2001. "When do special interests run rampant ? disentangling the role in banking crises of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2543, The World Bank.
    8. Colburn, Christopher B. & Hudgins, Sylvia C., 1996. "The influence on Congress by the thrift industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 473-494, April.
    9. Brock, Philip L., 1998. "Financial safety nets and incentive structures in Latin America," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1993, The World Bank.
    10. Kupiec, Paul H. & Ramirez, Carlos D., 2013. "Bank failures and the cost of systemic risk: Evidence from 1900 to 1930," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 285-307.
    11. Randall S. Kroszner, 2000. "The economics and politics of financial modernization," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 25-37.
    12. Antoniades, Alexis & Calomiris, Charles W., 2020. "Mortgage market credit conditions and U.S. Presidential elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).

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    Keywords

    interest rate ; savings ; risk;
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