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Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises

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Listed author(s):
  • Atif R. Mian
  • Amir Sufi
  • Francesco Trebbi

Abstract

Debtors bear the brunt of a decline in asset prices associated with financial crises and policies aimed at partial debt relief may be warranted to boost growth in the midst of crises. Drawing on the US experience during the Great Recession of 2008-09 and historical evidence in a large panel of countries, we explore why the political system may fail to deliver such policies. We find that during the Great Recession creditors were able to use the political system more effectively to protect their interests through bailouts. More generally we show that politically countries become more polarized and fractionalized following financial crises. This results in legislative stalemate, making it less likely that crises lead to meaningful macroeconomic reforms.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 17831.

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Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2012
Publication status: published as Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2014. "Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 1-28, April.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17831
Note: CF EFG POL
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
  • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
  • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
  • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

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  1. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "The Aftermath of Financial Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 466-472, May.
  2. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1992. " Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1343-1366, September.
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  4. Adi Brender & Allan Drazen, 2008. "How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 2203-2220, December.
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  7. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2010. "The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 1967-1998, December.
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  12. Patrick Bolton & Howard Rosenthal, 2002. "Political Intervention in Debt Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 1103-1134, October.
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Cited by:

  1. De Haas, Ralph & Djourelova, Milena & Nikolova, Elena, 2016. "The Great Recession and social preferences: Evidence from Ukraine," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 92-107.
  2. Autor, David & Dorn, David & Hanson, Gordon & Majlesi, Kaveh, 2016. "Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure," Working Papers 2016:21, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  3. Frieden, Jeffry, 2015. "The political economy of adjustment and rebalancing," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 4-14.
  4. David Lodge & Marta Rodriguez-Vives, 2013. "How long can austerity persist? The factors that sustain fiscal consolidations," European Journal of Government and Economics, Europa Grande, vol. 2(1), pages 5-24, June.
  5. Francesco Trebbi & Kairong Xiao, 2015. "Regulation and Market Liquidity," NBER Working Papers 21739, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Ernesto Crivelli & Sanjeev Gupta & Carlos Mulas-Granados & Carolina Correa-Caro, 2016. "Fragmented Politics and Public Debt," IMF Working Papers 16/190, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Claudia I. Dobre & Costin I. Răsăuţeanu, 2016. "Global Economic Crisis and Government Intervention," Ovidius University Annals, Economic Sciences Series, Ovidius University of Constantza, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 0(2), pages 14-19, February.
  8. Montagnoli, Alberto & Moro, Mirko & Panos, Georgios A. & Wright, Robert E., 2016. "Financial Literacy and Political Orientation in Great Britain," IZA Discussion Papers 10285, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  9. Carmen M. Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, 2016. "Sovereign Debt Relief And Its Aftermath," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 215-251, 02.
  10. Hansen, Ole-Petter Moe & Legge, Stefan, 2015. "Trading off Welfare and Immigration in Europe," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 22/2015, Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics.
  11. Funke, Manuel & Schularick, Moritz & Trebesch, Christoph, 2016. "Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870–2014," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 227-260.
  12. Oksana Kramarenko, 2015. "The Development of Strategic Bank Lending Industries in the Context of Globalization," Economy of region, Centre for Economic Security, Institute of Economics of Ural Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences, vol. 1(3), pages 228-241.
  13. Octavia Foarta, 2016. "Politically Feasible Public Bailouts," 2016 Meeting Papers 1479, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  14. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2013. "Rational Ignorance, Elections, and Reform," MPRA Paper 68638, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Dec 2015.
  15. Abuka, Charles & Alinda, Ronnie & Minoiu, Camelia & Peydró, José Luis & Presbitero, Andrea, 2017. "Financial Development and Monetary Policy: Loan Applications, Rates, and Real Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 12171, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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