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Political Intervention in Debt Contracts

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  • Patrick Bolton
  • Howard Rosenthal

Abstract

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of an agricultural economy in which poor farmers borrow from rich farmers. Because output is stochastic (we allow for idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks), there may be default ex post. We compare equilibria with and without political intervention. Intervention takes the form of a moratorium and is decided by voting. When bad economic shocks are highly likely, state-contingent debt moratoria always improve ex post efficiency and may also improve ex ante efficiency. Moreover, the threat of moratoria enhances efficiency. When adverse macro shocks are unlikely, state-contingent moratoria always improve ex ante welfare by completing incomplete debt contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Bolton & Howard Rosenthal, 2002. "Political Intervention in Debt Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 1103-1134, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:110:y:2002:i:5:p:1103-1134
    DOI: 10.1086/341867
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Rucker, Randal R & Alston, Lee J, 1987. "Farm Failures and Government Intervention: A Case Study of the 1930' s," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 724-730, September.
    6. Alston, Lee J., 1983. "Farm Foreclosures in the United States During the Interwar Period," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(4), pages 885-903, December.
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