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Short-Term Contracts as a Monitoring Device

Author

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  • Patrick Rey
  • Joseph E. Stiglitz

Abstract

This paper focuses on two separate problems. The first is that frequently, the most profitable use of funds involves long-term investments, which militiates for long-term debt contracts. The second problem is to monitor the investor's use of funds, as exemplified by the U.S. S&L saga, and we argue that short-term debt provides investors, who can withdraw their funds, with a real threat over firms. We show that short-term investors have both desirable incentives to exert control and invest in monitoring, and that this monitoring concern provides an explanation of the often lamented disparity between the maturity of banks' assets and liabilities. We also explore in detail the trade-off between long-term and short-term debt, including the possibility of multiple contracts and of priority rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Rey & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1993. "Short-Term Contracts as a Monitoring Device," NBER Working Papers 4514, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4514
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    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w4514.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
    2. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    3. Kane, Edward J, 1989. "The High Cost of Incompletely Funding the FSLIC Shortage of Explicit Capital," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 31-47, Fall.
    4. Jaffee, Dwight M, 1989. "Symposium on Federal Deposit Insurance for S&L Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 3-9, Fall.
    5. Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 647-663.
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    Cited by:

    1. Luis Opazo & Claudio Raddatz & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2015. "Institutional Investors and Long-Term Investment: Evidence from Chile," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 29(3), pages 479-522.
    2. Musalem, Alberto R. & Impavido, Gregorio & Tressel, Thierry, 2001. "Contractual savings, capital markets, and firms'financing choices," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2612, The World Bank.
    3. Juan J. Cortina & Tatiana Didier & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2017. "Corporate Debt Maturity in Developing Countries: Sources of Long- and Short-Termism," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers 142, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.
    4. Memmel, Christoph & Gündüz, Yalin & Raupach, Peter, 2015. "The common drivers of default risk," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 16(C), pages 232-247.
    5. Impavido, Gregorio & Musalem, Alberto R. & Tressel, Thierry, 2001. "Contractual savings institutions and banks'stability and efficiency," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2751, The World Bank.
    6. Kharroubi, E., 2006. "Illiquidity, Financial Development and the Growth-Volatility Relationship Illiquidity, Financial Development and the Growth-Volatility Relationship," Working papers 139, Banque de France.
    7. Basu , Kaushik & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2013. "International lending, sovereign debt and joint liability : an economic theory model for amending the treaty of Lisbon," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6555, The World Bank.
    8. Alanis, Emmanuel & Beladi, Hamid & Quijano, Margot, 2015. "Uninsured deposits as a monitoring device: Their impact on bond yields of banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 77-88.

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