Politics and the Determinants of Banking Crises: the Effects of Political Checks and Balances
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- Philip Keefer, 2002. "Politics and the Determinants of Banking Crises: The Effects of Political Checks and Balances," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.), Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 3, pages 085-112 Central Bank of Chile.
References listed on IDEAS
- Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March.
- George A. Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, 1993. "Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(2), pages 1-74.
- Nouriel Roubini & Jeffrey Sachs, 1989. "Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrial Economies," NBER Working Papers 2919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
- Alberto Alesina & Geoffrey Carliner, 1991. "Politics and Economics in the Eighties," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number ales91-1, June.
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- Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2008.
"Inflation, Central Bank Independence, and the Legal System,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(4), pages 751-777, December.
- Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2005. "Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System," ICER Working Papers 02-2005, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, 2005. "Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 57, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
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NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-02-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-IFN-2002-02-15 (International Finance)
- NEP-PKE-2002-02-15 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-POL-2002-02-15 (Positive Political Economics)
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