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Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict

  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Morath, Florian

We study conflict between two groups of individuals. Using Schaffer`s (1988) concept of evolutionary stability we provide an evolutionary underpinning for in-group altruism combined with spiteful behavior towards members of the rival out-group. We characterize the set of evolutionarily stable combinations of in-group favoritism and out-group spite and find that an increase in in-group altruism can be balanced by a decrease in spiteful behavior towards the out-group.

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File URL: http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13963/1/SSRN-id1881550.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Munich Reprints in Economics with number 13963.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology 306(2012): pp. 61-67
Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:13963
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