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Looting and Conflict between Ethnoregional Groups

Author

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  • JEAN-PAUL AZAM

    (ARQADE University of Toulouse, France)

Abstract

A game-theoretic model is analyzed for discussing the determination of looting and fighting activity during a civil war between two ethnoregional groups. The Nash equilibrium of this game emphasizes population size, production capacity and productivity, and access to external funding as the main determinants of the size of the armies and the intensity of looting activity. The Nash equilibrium of the game between the two warlords involves an excessive level of looting. Some lessons are drawn from this framework to bring out the minimum redistribution of resources between groups that must take place in a peaceful equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Paul Azam, 2002. "Looting and Conflict between Ethnoregional Groups," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(1), pages 131-153, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:46:y:2002:i:1:p:131-153
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002702046001008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Francis Eliya Lomami, 2024. "Grounded Immoral and Irrational Features of Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo," Journal of Conflict Management, IPRJB, vol. 4(4), pages 37-63.
    4. Ola Olsson & Heather Congdon Fors, 2004. "Congo: The Prize of Predation," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 41(3), pages 321-336, May.
    5. Andonova Veneta & Zuleta Hernando, 2009. "Beyond Moral Hazard: The Effect of Firm-Level Compensation Strategies on Economic Conflict," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 79-101, October.
    6. Kai A. Konrad & Vai-Lam Mui, 2017. "The Prince—or Better No Prince? The Strategic Value of Appointing a Successor," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(10), pages 2158-2182, November.
    7. Olsson, Ola, 2007. "Conflict diamonds," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 267-286, March.
    8. Max Blouin & Stéphane Pallage, 2008. "Humanitarian Relief and Civil Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(4), pages 548-565, August.
    9. Jose Cuesta & Mansoob Murshed, 2008. "The Micro-foundations of Social Contracts, Civil Conflicts and International Peace-Making," Research Working Papers 8, MICROCON - A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict.
    10. Hernando Zuleta & Veneta Andonova, 2006. "Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria, a private path to prosperity," Documentos de Trabajo 2181, Universidad del Rosario.
    11. Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, 2010. "Civil War," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 3-57, March.
    12. Moshik Lavie & Christophe Muller, 2011. "Incentives and Survival in Violent Conflicts," IDEP Working Papers 1102, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised Apr 2011.
    13. Du, Jinming, 2019. "Redistribution promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games under aspiration dynamics," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 363(C), pages 1-1.
    14. Kevin Siqueira & Todd Sandler, 2006. "Terrorists versus the Government," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(6), pages 878-898, December.
    15. Colin Jennings & Hein Roelfsema, 2008. "Civil Conflict, Federalism and Strategic Delegation of Leadership," Working Papers 08-03, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
    16. Kai A. Konrad & Stergios Skaperdas, 2007. "Succession Rules and Leadership Rents," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(4), pages 622-645, August.
    17. Francisco Herreros & Henar Criado, 2009. "Pre-emptive or Arbitrary," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(3), pages 419-445, June.
    18. Oliver Vanden Eynde, 2018. "Targets of Violence: Evidence from India's Naxalite Conflict," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(609), pages 887-916, March.
    19. Martin Ottmann, 2017. "Rebel constituencies and rebel violence against civilians in civil conflicts," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(1), pages 27-51, January.
    20. Aniruddha Bagchi & João Ricardo Faria & Timothy Mathews, 2019. "A model of a multilateral proxy war with spillovers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 229-248, June.
    21. Stergios Skaperdas, 2008. "An economic approach to analyzing civil wars," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 25-44, January.
    22. Colin Jennings & Hein Roelfsema, 2008. "Civil Conflict, Federalism and Strategic Delegation of Leadership," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 45(4), pages 557-573, July.
    23. Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, 2006. "Internal conflict, terrorism and crime in Colombia," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(1), pages 137-150.
    24. Kai A. Konrad & Vai-Lam Mui, 2015. "The Prince – or better no prince? The Strategic Value of Appointing a Successor," Monash Economics Working Papers 15-15, Monash University, Department of Economics.

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