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The Micro-foundations of Social Contracts, Civil Conflicts and International Peace-Making

  • Jose Cuesta

    ()

    (Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C.)

  • Mansoob Murshed

    ()

    (Institute of Social Studies, The Hague)

This paper explores the micro-foundations of conflict generation and persistence within the traditional greed and grievance non-cooperative set up between a government and a rebel group. We expand the traditional model in various ways. First, we allow for the reaction curves of both parties in non-cooperative games to be substitutes and not inevitably complementary, so a peaceful strategy from a group may be followed by a belligerent upsurge from the other. Second, we also allow for diasporas’ transfers to rebel groups, thus generating a trade-off between the gains associated with peace and war among rebels. Third, we expand external aid in the form of fungible financing of government transfers ‘buying’ peace by allowing for mechanisms that induce behavioural change towards peace in a cooperative model of principal-agent well-intended (Nordic-like) donors. These extensions provide a better understanding of conflict persistence, the consequences of competing international aid and why sub-optimal sanctions provision (‘cheap talk’) by the international community are frequent.

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File URL: http://www.microconflict.eu/publications/RWP8_JC_MM.pdf
File Function: First version, 2008
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Paper provided by MICROCON - A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict in its series Research Working Papers with number 8.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mcn:rwpapr:8
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  1. Azam, Jean-Paul & Mesnard, Alice, 2001. "Civil War and the Social Contract," IDEI Working Papers 124, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  2. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 1998. "On Economic Causes of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 563-73, October.
  3. Azam, Jean-Paul, 2005. "Can the Peace Be Imported?," IDEI Working Papers 356, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  4. Patricia Justino, 2006. "On the Links between Violent Conflict and Chronic Poverty: How Much Do We Really Know?," HiCN Working Papers 18, Households in Conflict Network.
  5. Gernot Doppelhofer & Ronald I. Miller & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2000. "Determinants of Long-Term Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach," NBER Working Papers 7750, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Tony Addison & Philippe Le Billon & S. Mansoob Murshed, 2002. "Conflict in Africa: The Cost of Peaceful Behaviour," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 11(3), pages 365-386, September.
  7. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Thierry Verdier, 2003. "Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule," NBER Working Papers 10136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Alesina, Alberto, et al, 1996. " Political Instability and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 189-211, June.
  9. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 2000. "Greed and grievance in civil war," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2355, The World Bank.
  10. Tony Addison & S. Mansoob Murshed, 2002. "Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 39(4), pages 487-501, July.
  11. Christa N Brunnschweiler & Erwin H Bulte, 2009. "Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Resource abundance, dependence and the onset of civil wars," OxCarre Working Papers 018, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
  12. Roubini, Nouriel & Swagel, Phillip & Ozler, Sule & Alesina, Alberto, 1996. "Political Instability and Economic Growth," Scholarly Articles 4553024, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  13. Jean-Paul Azam, 2001. "The redistributive state and conflicts in Africa," CSAE Working Paper Series 2001-03, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
  14. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
  15. Edward Miguel & Shanker Satyanath & Ernest Sergenti, 2004. "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 725-753, August.
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