From Conflict to Reconstruction: Reviving the Social Contract
Contemporary civil wars are rooted in a partial or complete breakdown of the social contract, often involving disputes over public spending, resource revenues, and taxation. A feasible social contract gives potential rebels something akin to a transfer. When this is improbable, and the potential spoils are rich then warfare is more likely. Grievances, not just pure greed, motivate war. But peace deals can also break down when commitments are not credible. Successful reconstruction after war must rebuild the social contract. The chances of success increase if the economy can achieve broad- based growth. If grievances can be satisfied by absolute improvements in living standards the present donor focus on absolute poverty reduction will be conducive to reviving the social contract. But if grievances are expressed in relative terms, governments and donors must also address inequality and regional gaps. [Discussion Paper No.2001/48]
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1992.
"Anarchy and Its Breakdown,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
674, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992.
"Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September.
- Skaperdas, S., 1991. "Cooperation, Conflict And Power In The Absence Of Property Rights," Papers 90-91-06a, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Azam, Jean-Paul & Mesnard, Alice, 2001.
"Civil War and the Social Contract,"
IDEI Working Papers
124, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Addison, Tony & Murshed, S. Mansoob, 2001.
"Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking,"
Working Paper Series
UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2000.
"Contract or War? On the Consequences of a Broader View of Self-Interest in Economics,"
The American Economist,
Omicron Delta Epsilon, vol. 44(1), pages 5-16, March.
- Garfinkel, M.R. & Skaperdas, S., 2000. "Contract or War? On the Consequences of a Broader View of Self-Interest in Economics," Papers 99-00-12, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Jean-Paul Azam, 2001.
"The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa,"
Journal of Peace Research,
Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 38(4), pages 429-444, July.
- repec:fth:oxesaf:2001-3 is not listed on IDEAS
- Robert H. Bates, 2000. "Ethnicity and Development in Africa: A Reappraisal," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 131-134, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:3206. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Padma Prakash)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.