From Conflict to Reconstruction: Reviving the Social Contract
Contemporary civil wars are rooted in a partial or complete breakdown of the social contract, often involving disputes over public spending, resource revenues, and taxation. A feasible social contract gives potential rebels something akin to a transfer. When this is improbable, and the potential spoils are rich then warfare is more likely. Grievances, not just pure greed, motivate war. But peace deals can also break down when commitments are not credible. Successful reconstruction after war must rebuild the social contract. The chances of success increase if the economy can achieve broad- based growth. If grievances can be satisfied by absolute improvements in living standards the present donor focus on absolute poverty reduction will be conducive to reviving the social contract. But if grievances are expressed in relative terms, governments and donors must also address inequality and regional gaps. [Discussion Paper No.2001/48]
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995.
"Anarchy and Its Breakdown,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1992. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," UCLA Economics Working Papers 674, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jean-Paul Azam, 2001. "The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 38(4), pages 429-444, July.
- Jean-Paul Azam, 2001. "The redistributive state and conflicts in Africa," CSAE Working Paper Series 2001-03, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2000. "Contract or War? On the Consequences of a Broader View of Self-Interest in Economics," The American Economist, , vol. 44(1), pages 5-16, March.
- Garfinkel, M.R. & Skaperdas, S., 2000. "Contract or War? On the Consequences of a Broader View of Self-Interest in Economics," Papers 99-00-12, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Azam, Jean-Paul & Mesnard, Alice, 2003. "Civil War and the Social Contract," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(3-4), pages 455-475, June.
- Azam, Jean-Paul & Mesnard, Alice, 2001. "Civil War and the Social Contract," IDEI Working Papers 124, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Tony Addison & S. Mansoob Murshed, 2002. "Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 39(4), pages 487-501, July.
- Addison, Tony & Murshed, S. Mansoob, 2001. "Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking," WIDER Working Paper Series 045, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Tony Addison & S Mansoob Murshed, 2010. "Credibility and Reputationin Peacemaking," Working Papers id:3288, eSocialSciences.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-739, September.
- Skaperdas, S., 1991. "Cooperation, Conflict And Power In The Absence Of Property Rights," Papers 90-91-06a, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Robert H. Bates, 2000. "Ethnicity and Development in Africa: A Reappraisal," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 131-134, May.
- repec:fth:oxesaf:2001-3 is not listed on IDEAS Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)