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Anarchy, Groups, and Conflict: An Experiment on the Emergence of Protective Associations

  • Adam C. Smith

    ()

    (Department of Economics, George Mason University)

  • David B. Skarbek

    ()

    (Department of Economics, George Mason University)

  • Bart J. Wilson

    ()

    (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University)

In this paper, we investigate the implications of the philosophical considerations presented in Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia, by examining group formation in a laboratory setting where subjects engage in both cooperative and conflictual interactions. We endow participants with a commodity used to generate earnings, plunder others, or protect against plunder. In our primary treatment, we allow participants to form groups to pool their resources. We conduct a baseline comparison treatment that does not allow group formation. We find that allowing subjects to organize themselves into groups does not lead to more cooperation and may in fact exacerbate tendencies for conflict.

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Paper provided by Chapman University, Economic Science Institute in its series Working Papers with number 09-03.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:09-03
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