An experimental investigation of Hobbesian jungles
Hobbes's state of nature serves as the analytical starting point for much of what economists have written on anarchy and the formation of government. Unfortunately little historical evidence exists about how men behaved in a "state of nature", if such a situation ever even existed. We conducted a laboratory experiment to create a Hobbesian state of nature and observe the level of economic efficiency subjects achieve. We also investigate Buchanan's conjecture that people would unanimously agree to a social contract against theft.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-55, December.
- repec:tiu:tiutis:fe79a9d2-e9e3-4dbc-9539-cdece886993d is not listed on IDEAS
- Yvonne Durham & Jack Hirshleifer & Vernon L. Smith, 1997.
"Do the Richer get Richer and the Poor Poorer? Experimental Tests of a Model of Power,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
770, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Durham, Yvonne & Hirshleifer, Jack & Smith, Vernon L, 1998. "Do the Rich Get Richer and the Poor Poorer? Experimental Tests of a Model of Power," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 970-83, September.
- Stefan Voigt, 1999. "Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 283-300, October.
- Horan, Richard D. & Bulte, Erwin & Shogren, Jason F., 2005. "How trade saved humanity from biological exclusion: an economic theory of Neanderthal extinction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-29, September.
- Cowen, Tyler & Sutter, Daniel, 1999. "The Costs of Cooperation," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 161-73, November.
- Duffy, John & Kim, Minseong, 2005. "Anarchy in the laboratory (and the role of the state)," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 297-329, March.
- Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
- Friedman, David D., 1994. "Law as a Private Good: A Response to Tyler Cowen on the Economics of Anarchy," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(02), pages 319-327, October.
- Carter, John R. & Anderton, Charles H., 2001. "An experimental test of a predator-prey model of appropriation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 83-97, May.
- Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March.
- Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
- Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2004. "Blood, Baath and Beyond: the Constitutional Dilemma of Iraq," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(1_2), pages 13-30, 04.
- Cowen, Tyler, 1992. "Law as a Public Good: The Economics of Anarchy," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(02), pages 249-267, October.
- Vernon L. Smith, 1998. "The Two Faces of Adam Smith," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 2-19, July.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1991. "The Paradox Of Power," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(3), pages 177-200, November.
- Hoffman, Elizabeth & Spitzer, Matthew L, 1982.
"The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 73-98, April.
- Bush, Winston C. & Mayer, Lawrence S., 1974. "Some implications of anarchy for the distribution of property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 401-412, August.
- Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon, 1994. "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 346-380, November.
- R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker, 1988.
"Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 103(1), pages 179-199.
- R. M. Isaac & J. M. Walker, 2010. "Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contribution mechanism," Levine's Working Paper Archive 310, David K. Levine.
- Todd L. Cherry & Peter Frykblom & Jason F. Shogren, 2002.
"Hardnose the Dictator,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1218-1221, September.
- Gordon Tullock, 1985. "Adam Smith and the Prisoners' Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(Supplemen), pages 1073-1081.
- Smith,Vernon L., 2005.
"Bargaining and Market Behavior,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521021487, June.
- James Andreoni & John H Miller, 1997.
"Rational Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma: experimental evidence,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
670, David K. Levine.
- Andreoni, James A & Miller, John H, 1993. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(418), pages 570-85, May.
- Andreoni, J. & Miller, J.H., 1991. "Rational Cooperative in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence," Working papers 9102, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1988. "Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 1-36, January.
- Caplan, Bryan & Stringham, Edward, 2003.
"Networks, law, and the paradox of cooperation,"
26086, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:66:y:2008:i:3-4:p:669-686. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.